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Operational Summary 
Introduction 
During the last decade, South Asia’s five largest countries - India, Palustan, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Nepal - have been implementing trade pol icy reforms, gradually moving their economies 
away f rom protectionism toward greater trade openness and global economic integration. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the four mainland countries began to fo l low the liberalizing course o n  which Sri 
Lanka had embarked in the late 1970s. For five years after 1997, trade liberalization in India moved 
ahead in a major way with the removal o f  most remaining QRs, but it stalled and went backwards in some 
other respects. However, the liberalizing momentum resumed with large cuts in industrial tariffs 
between 2002 and February 2004. In Bangladesh, fkom the mid-1990s some aspects o f  trade policy 
reform continued, although more slowly, but in other respects import policies steadily became more 
selective and protective until this trend was reversed to some extent in Bangladesh’s 2004/05 budget. 
Other developments -- Pakistan’s comprehensive liberalization o f  i t s  trade policies since 1996/97 
(including i t s  agricultural trade p olicies), and S ri L anka’s p otential to resume 1 ong-deferred r eform a s 
prospects improve o f  ending i t s  c iv i l  war - contribute to a regional picture o f  very mixed achievement but 
widely shared opportunity. The South Asian countries missed the tide that carried many o f  their East and 
Southeast Asian neighbors to record rates o f  growth and poverty reduction during the 1960s and 1970s, 
but their later trade pol icy and other liberalizing reforms came in time to for them to benefit f rom the 
expansion o f  production and trade in the wor ld  economy during the 1990s. They now have an 
opportunity to undertake a third phase o f  reform in which they could further lower their barriers against 
trade-by general developing standards s t i l l  very high in Indian and Bangladesh- and further strengthen 
their economies’ performance through international commerce and competition. 
Each country faces differing opportunities to exploit and resistances to  overcome. Because many 
o f  their circumstances and choices are similar, however, this paper seeks to assess their situations 
collectively as wel l  as separately. M a n y  o f  i t s  findings are broadly applicable. So, with allowances for 
historic, economic and social differences, are many o f  i t s  pol icy recommendations. 
The bulk of the report describes key aspects of the current trade regimes in the Jive largest 
South Asian states and the policies and practices that have produced the systems now in place. It 
principally focuses o n  traditional trade policies which affect imports and exports i.e. tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, anti-dumping, export policies, and to a l imi ted extent aspects o f  sanitary and technical 
regulations which affect trade. All o f  these are s t i l l  major issues o f  concem and debate in South Asia. The 
report does not attempt to describe where the South Asian countries stand on newer trade policy issues 
which are prominent in WTO negotiations, such as trade in services, intellectual property, government 
procurement and Customs valuation. T o  do so comprehensively for  each o f  the f ive major countries 
would be a major new task o n  i t s  own. The report also does not  attempt to place the South Asian 
countries’ trade policies in the context o f  their trade and other aspects o f  their economic performance. I t s  
purpose i s  rather to provide up-to-date information about, and interpretations of, the current trade policies 
it covers, with the idea that this should provide starting points for  further applied economic research on 
useful and relevant topics, as we l l  as points o f  reference and factual information for discussion and 
debate. 
Nevertheless, the report does assess, o n  theoretical and empirical grounds, the appropriateness o f  
the policies described. Conclusions and suggestions for change are generally summarized at the end o f  
each stocktaking section. This summary, in condensing the work  o f  stock-taking, highlights the key 
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issues that a l l  or most o f  the countries have addressed and need to pursue further. To reinforce the 
operational nature o f  those findings, the summary deals with the recommendations next, as an immediate 
continuation o f  the central policy questions. I t  then reviews trade policies in three key sectors- 
agriculture, fertilizers, and textiles and clothing. 
Key Trade Policy Issues in South Asia 
Trade, growth and poverty reduction 
The broadest finding i s  not  unique to the South Asia region or this examination o f  trade policies. 
I t  stems f rom the experience o f  nations everywhere since the end o f  Wor ld  War 11: openness to external 
trade and foreign investment permits more rapid economic growth than protectionist regimes achieve; in 
developing countries that choose integration with the global economy, such growth proves an efficient, 
effective instrument o f p overty a lleviation. In  S outh A sia, during t h e  1 990s, a s I n d i a  a n d  B angladesh 
followed S ri L anka i n t o  the ranks o f  c ountries k n o w n  as rapid g lobalizers, strong g rowth  ta l l ied with 
sharp drops in poverty incidence - from 51% in 1977-78 to 27% in 1999-2000 in India, and f rom 45% in 
1991 to 34% in 2000 in Bangladesh. 
Supported by both general and regional 
evidence, the premise o f  this study i s  that the poor o f  
South Asia would be among the significant 
beneficiaries o f w ider, faster, m ore d etermined trade 
liberalization than policymakers have so far pursued. 
A major finding o f  recent empirical research o n  
international economic integration (Art Kraay and 
Dav id  Dollar, 2001) has been that a third o f  the 
developing countries o f  the world, described as “rapid 
globalizers”, did extremely wel l  in terms o f  income 
growth and poverty reduction over the past two 
decades or so. These countries, which include 
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka in South Asia, have 
also experienced large increases in trade and 
significant reductions in tar i f f  and non-tariff barriers. 
For  the South Asia region as a whole, the period 1985- 
2000 saw significantly higher per capita GDP growth 
performance, although Palustan (political reasons) and 
Sri Lanka (ethnic conflict) suffered setbacks in the 
1990s (Fig.1 &2). The effect on reduction in poverty 
in India was dramatic, entirely in keeping with the 
Bhagwati hypothesis o f  the early 1960s that growth i s  
the principal driver o f  poverty reduction. 
For the South Asian developing countries, 
we l l  endowed with labor, trade openness i s  expected to 
stimulate production and expansion o f  labor-intensive 
exports, thus generating employment, raising wages, 
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and thereby reducing poverty. But the linkage between greater trade openness and poverty reduction need 
not  be direct, but rather through the positive impact o f  trade expansion o n  growth performance - a 
correlation that has been established in extensive empirical research. Cross-country studies o n  the 
relationship between growth performance and poverty reduction lead to the conclusion that there exists a 
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close correspondence between growth o f  per capita income and growth o f  incomes o f  the poor, though 
not  al l  growth i s  necessarily pro-poor. 
More importantly, trade openness i s  a necessary, not  a sufficient condition for rapid growth. 
Trade policy reforms generally need to be accompanied by complementary measures for ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and efficient financial intermediation, improving infrastructure services, 
removing burdensome regulations and in these and other ways, improving the investment climate for 
private enterprise. 
T h e  political economy o f  protection 
There i s  n o w  a broad consensus in South Asia that openness to trade must be a key component o f  
policies to accelerate economic growth. Despite this, when it comes to actually implementing measures 
that reduce protection or subsidies for domestic producers, as elsewhere in the world, there i s  
understandable opposition f rom the enterprises and other interest groups that feel that they may be 
adversely affected. The interests which resist change often include the bureaucracies which are 
responsible for the administration o f  tariffs and protective controls, which frequently see trade 
liberalization as a threat to their jobs and the incomes which go with them, both their salaries and the 
informal opportunities that their positions provide for extra-legal incomes. This opposition i s  often 
reinforced by long held attitudes carried over f rom the post-independence pursuit o f  inward-loolung, 
government-directed economic policies that have a basic distrust o f  both private enterprise and 
international markets, and consider that the best path to economic development i s  the promotion o f  
domestic output, owned or at least controlled by the public sector, as a substitute for  imports. 
In spite o f  strong international evidence to the contrary, there are s t i l l  many groups in South Asia 
with polit ical connections which hold these and similar views, especially in India, Bangladesh and 
Palustan. Their influence on trade pol icy has been minor in recent years in Pakistan, but i t  i s  significant, 
although declining rapidly in India and Bangladesh. There are also strong protectionist forces at work in 
some sectors in Sri Lanka and Nepal, but these are predominantly driven by straightforward producer 
interests (notably agricultural protectionism in S r i  Lanka) and have litt le t o  do with general ideological 
positions opposing open trade. However, an important new development throughout the region that i s  
creating pressures for increased protection o f  agriculture (understood in the broad sense to include 
livestock, fisheries and food processing industries), i s  much greater awareness than in the past o f  the 
instability o f  international commodity prices and the diff iculty o f  managing these price swings i f domestic 
agricultural markets are open to imports and very large numbers o f  small scale, l o w  income farmers 
would be affected. These positions have been reinforced by the continuing strong resistance in developed 
countries to the scaling down o f  their agricultural subsidies in the ongoing WTO negotiations. These two 
factors underly strongly protectionist and interventionist trends in Indian agricultural trade policies over 
the past few years, similar but less marked trends in Bangladesh, and the continuation o f  high protection 
for  Sri Lanka’s major import substitution crops. 
With such attitudes s t i l l  strong, trade pol icy reforms in the South Asia region frequently face s t i f f  
resistance, and there are active and often successful efforts not only by established interest groups but also 
by n ew f i r m s  a n d  i ndustries, t o obtain special treatment o r t o b e e xcluded o r  p artially e xcluded f rom 
general trade liberalization measures. The abil ity o f  individual producers and producer groups to negotiate 
for and obtain special treatment i s  greatly facilitated when trade regimes are complex, ad hoc and non- 
transparent. Overall, the South Asian countries have made considerable progress in simplifying their trade 
regimes and malung them more transparent, especially through the elimination o f  most QRs, the reduction 
and simplification o f  Customs schedules, and available 
information. However, there are some important exceptions to these trends, notably in Bangladesh where 
greatly improved up-to-date and publ ic ly 
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easily understandable basic information on the trade regime i s  unavailable or diff icult to obtain, and 
where the tar i f f  system remains complex and obscure, mainly due to the proliferating use o f  para-tariffs. 
In India, n ew forms o f a d  h oc and  n on-transparent protection have e merged, e specially through t he 
widespread use o f  anti-dumping, specific duties, and SPS and TBT rules. 
In this regard, the report emphasizes the importance o f  cross-border spillover effects in the 
region, not only o n  trade but on trade policies. This i s  especially pertinent for India’s policies, which are 
carefully watched in the smaller contiguous states, in some cases encouraging pol icy makers to undertake 
similar liberalizing reforms, with broad support f rom their own constituents, but in others malung it more 
diff icult t o  resist new protectionist measures. 
As i s  the case throughout the world, in both developed and developing countries, in South Asia 
inertia, ideological opposition, the existence o f  groups that gain f rom restricting trade, and others that 
feel that they would lose from the resulting competition, have slowed the momentum towards more 
open trade policies. The region’s trade reform agenda, as a result, remains vast and unfinished. In the 
next section, we outline some broad policy areas where progress i s  needed, to degrees which vary 
considerably by country and by topic. 
Priorities and recommendations for trade policy reform 
T r a d e  policies and exchange rate  policies 
One broad area o f  notable advance which has facilitated trade pol icy reforms, in the region, i s  the 
move towards more market-based exchange-rate regimes. India, Palustan, and Sr i  Lanka now maintain 
floating exchange rates; Bangladesh, which had a moderately flexible exchange rate system after 1991, 
floated i t s  currency as o f  M a y  2003. Maldives’s currency i s  pegged to the US dollar, and periodically 
devalued. Nepal’s and Bhutan’s currencies are pegged to the Indian rupee. Floating or f lexibly managed 
exchange rates have been important supports for the trade liberalizations that have occurred in the region, 
by offsetting or partially offsetting the effects o f  QR removal and tar i f f  cuts on import competition for 
domestic industries, and by increasing the domestic currency prices received by export industries. 
Because o f  their f ixed exchange rates with the Indian Rupee, for Nepal  and Bhutan, these effects have 
been partial and indirect and have not affected their trade with India. More  generally, unlike the other 
South Asian countries, they are not able to use the exchange rate as a means o f  adjusting to terms-of-trade 
and more general macro-economic changes. 
The massive devaluation o f  the Indian Rupee between 1985 and 1992 (in real terms almost 150% 
as measured by i t s  Real Effective Exchange Rate index or REER) facilitated India’s init ial slow trade 
liberalization during the late 1980s, and made i t s  much more sweeping post 1991 import liberalization 
program on the whole quite painless. Because Nepal’s currency i s  t ied to the Indian Rupee, the same 
Indian devaluation also supported the major liberalization o f  Nepal’s import  policies that was 
implemented in the early 1990s. Palustan’s REER was devalued at a steady rate between the mid-1980s 
and 1992, stabilized at or slightly below this level until mid 1998, and then was devalued rather sharply 
until late 2001, after which it strengthened somewhat. The continuing real devaluation trend was in part a 
consequence of, but has also facilitated, trade liberalization, especially the new program that commenced 
in 1997. 
Bangladesh’s REER has been remarkably stable for over 20 years. The strength o f  the Taka i s  in 
part due to the rapid growth o f  ready-made garment exports and increasing remittances f rom Bangladesh 
workers outside the country. Together, these more than offset a id inf lows which declined relative to GDP, 
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and were sufficient to balance whatever increases in imports resulted f rom the trade liberalization 
measures that were implemented during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Compared to India and Pakistan, 
the Sri Lankan REER has moved within a relatively restricted range and currently the index i s  only about 
10-15 percent below i t s  level 22 years ago. An important reason for the relative stability o f  the Sri Lankan 
Rupee has been the rapid and sustained expansion o f  garment exports and tourism receipts. In Sri Lanka 
as in the other South Asian countries, in recent years flexibly managed or floating exchange rates have 
replaced t h e  p eriodic official use o f  multiple exchange rates in  the past, and largely eliminated black 
market premia, both o f  which used to be a source o f  distortions and rent seelung behavior that 
complicated the administration o f  import and export policies. 
The Indian devaluation up to 1992 was more than sufficient to sustain the pre-announced tar i f f  
reduction program that continued into the 199Os, and f rom 1992 to the present India’s REER index has 
remained at about the same level, reflecting nominal exchange rate changes that have approximately 
offset but not exceeded India’s inflation rate relative to the inflation rates o f  i t s  principal trading partner 
countries. However the init ial devaluations were much larger than the devaluations that occurred in 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, with the result that the Indian Rupee became much cheaper relative 
to their currencies in real terms. This has helped spur Indian regional exports, both recorded exports and 
unrecorded informal exports, especially to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, while malung it more diff icult for 
these countries to export to India. This expansion o f  Indian exports to the region represents a correction o f  
many earlier years during which exports which would otherwise have occurred were constrained by 
import  barriers in ‘ the other South Asian countries, and by the substantial overvaluation o f t he Indian 
Rupee, which was in turn a consequence o f  i t s  own highly restrictive import policies. 
The resulting bilateral trade deficits and increased competition for domestic industries have 
affected regional trade policies, with resistance to the expansion o f  tar i f f  preferences for India in 
Bangladesh, and by contrast a Sri Lankan initiative which culminated in 2000 in a free trade agreement 
with India. In Sri Lanka, the free trade agreement was perceived as having relatively l o w  trade diversion 
costs on the import side owing to Sri Lanka’s generally l o w  tariffs, and substantial potential benefits on 
the export side, provided India was willing to offer tar i f f  exemptions for products which Sri Lankan 
exporters can supply and which are s t i l l  subject to high MFN tariffs in India. In Bangladesh, o n  the other 
hand, tariffs and therefore the probable trade diversion costs o f  preferential Indian imports are high, as 
would be the competitive impact o n  local industries, while there i s  much pessimism about the prospects 
o f  Bangladesh exporters succeeding in the Indian market, even with duty free access. 
Fol lowing t h e  A sian financial c r i s i s  o f 1 997, the e xchange rates o f a number o f t  he E ast a n d  
South East Asian countries, including South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia were sharply 
devalued in real terms in relation to the South Asian currencies. This increased competition for South 
Asian exports and slowed down their growth, and at the same time sharpened import competition. With 
the notable exception o f  Palustan, this increase in import competition was an important factor in the 
slowing o f  the general momentum o f  import liberalization in the South Asia region, and i t s  reversal in 
some respects in India and Bangladesh between 1997 and 2002. The resumption o f  trade liberalization in 
India and Sri Lanka during 2002, in part reflected improvements in their balance o f  payments situations, 
which in turn are l inked to a pick-up in the growth o f  manufactured exports, in India the rapid expansion 
o f  software exports, and increased capital inflows. Consequently, in contrast to the earlier trade 
liberalizations, real exchange rates have so far not  weakened significantly and in the case o f  India have 
strengthened to  some extent. As a result, the effects o f  reforms such as tar i f f  reductions o n  import 
competing activities are presently not  being cushioned by exchange rate devaluation, which in turn has 
meant that they are polit ically more diff icult to manage, with pressures to make exceptions for f i r m s  or 
industries which are able to lobby effectively, or t o  obtain special treatment in various ways e.g. through 
tar i f f  increases, tariff reductions for intermediate inputs , anti-dumping in India, or through the application 
o f  SPS and TBT rules. 
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Recommendations on exchange rate policies 
Exchange-rate liberalization lays a foundation for, and facilitates greater openness in trade, and i t  
i s  desirable that the present flexible exchange rate policies being followed in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan should continue. However, exchange rate flexibil i ty i s  compatible with whatever trade 
policies these four countries choose to follow, including the continuation, tightening or loosening o f  their 
tar i f f  and non-tariff barriers to imports and other interventions in trade. For  Nepal and Bhutan, there are 
obvious major advantages in retaining the peg to the Indian Rupee, but this means that adapting to 
external and internal changes and shocks in an economically efficient manner, to a large extent needs to 
be handled through production a djustments rather than through alterations t o  trade policies (e.g. t a r i f f  
increases). H o w  the principal traditional instruments o f  trade pol icy are presently being managed in South 
Asia i s  discussed in the following sections. 
Non-tariff barriers to imports 
Compared to their past ro le these import barriers have shrunk dramatically throughout the region. 
Until very recently India s t i l l  had very comprehensive import licensing applied to al l  consumer goods, 
which were defined to include textile fabrics and most agricultural products: for  most o f  these products it 
was a defacto import ban. The last 715 goods on this l i s t  were only finally removed in April 2001. Since 
then, except for a few products in Sri Lanka and Nepal, only Bangladesh s t i l l  operates traditional QRs 
with the explicit purpose o f  protecting local industries, the most important o f  which are restrictions on the 
import o f  a range o f  textile products. I t  has also retained general administrative controls over imports 
which, depending h o w  they are implemented, can amount to a form o f  import  licensing. Palustan has 
abolished al l  i t s  traditional QRs, with the important proviso that al l  imports f rom India are banned, 
except for a positive l i s t  o f  677 items. T h i s  restriction i s  an outcome o f  the diff icult polit ical relations 
between India and Pakistan. India does not impose equivalent formal restrictions o n  exports to or imports 
f rom P ahstan, b ut o ther restrictions ( e.g. o n  travel, r emittances, C ustoms c learance e tc) are g enerally 
believed to have a similar effect, especially as regards imports. 
Even though formal protective import licensing has been abolished, a number o f  formally GATT- 
compatible non-tariff import controls over imports which act as protective NTBs, or have the potential to 
do so, are being operated in South Asia. These include: 
Government mandated import monopolies or State Trading Enterprises (STEs). India i s  the 
principal remaining user o f  STEs to control imports, notably o f  rice, wheat, a l l  coarse grains except 
maize and barley, and copra. These crops between them account for  about 40% o f  Indian 
agricultural GDP. I n d i a  imports o f  most petroleum products and o f  urea are also controlled by 
STEs. In the other South Asian countries, import monopoly STEs are important in the petroleum 
sectors, but otherwise their ro le has been drastically reduced, in particular in agricultural products 
and fertilizers where they previously played a major role. 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are being used by India to protect i t s  powdered milk and maize 
producers. These were introduced quite recently to p e m i t  small quotas o f t  hese products to be 
imported over moderate tariffs, while applying high tariffs (respectively 60 percent and 56 percent) 
which are probably prohibitive, to imports in excess o f  the quota amounts. The high tariffs for the 
out o f  quota quantities are compatible with India’s WTO commitments under the Agreement o n  
Agriculture because o f  i t s  high bindings (respectively 60 percent and 100 percent for these 
products). 
Technical standards and regulations. N e w  rules introduced in 2000 and being administered by the 
Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) are reported to be seriously restricting imports o f  a number of 
6 
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other products (including steel products for several years), but less i s  known about the situation in 
the other South Asian countries. 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules. Considerable attention i s  presently being paid in South 
Asia and elsewhere to the effects o f  developed country SPS ru les  o n  South Asian exports, but 
practically none to the potential import-restricting effects o f  the South Asian countries’ own rules. 
Some applied research on this aspect o f  SPS in South Asia would be useful. 
Other health and safety regulations. As an example, import bans or restrictions on second hand 
goods are justif ied on these grounds, but the predominant motive in many cases i s  clearly the 
protection o f  local producers e.g. the import o f  used clothing i s  banned in India but i s  allowed in the 
rest o f  South Asia; the import o f  second hand cars i s  banned in Palustan and restricted in India (in 
both countries there are heavily protected auto industries) but permitted in the other South Asian 
countries where there i s  n o  auto production; the import o f  second hand household machinery (e.g. 
refrigerators, air conditioners) i s  banned Palustan and restricted in India, but permitted elsewhere. 
Local content (Trade Related Investment Measures or TNMS) schemes which act as import QRs 
have been widely used f o r  many years throughout South Asia, but were never challenged even 
though they are clearly incompatible with basic GATT principles. The situation changed after the 
GATT rules were consolidated in the WTO TRIMS agreement, and India and Pakistan came under 
pressure f rom other WTO members to discontinue these arrangements. As a result, India dropped 
i t s  local content program for the auto industry, and Palustan has been phasing out local content 
rules applied to various engineering industries. However, in June 2004, Pakistan’s auto local 
content program was s t i l l  being operated, and there are also a number o f  TRIMS-style regulations 
in force in Bangladesh. 
Recommendations on non-tariff barriers to imports 
The use o f  import licensing, quotas and other quantitative controls over imports in order to 
protect domestic production, was the dominant and probably the economically most costly feature o f  the 
past import substitution trade regimes in South Asia. For many we l l  known reasons, i t i s  not in these 
countries’ interests for  protective NTBs to continue in explicit form, or to reemerge in new forms under 
the cover o f  GATT-consistent provisions allowing STE import monopolies, or health and safety, 
technical and similar regulations to be applied to imports. M a n y  o f  these non-tariff barriers could be 
abolished forthwith or relaxed and then removed during some pre-agreed period. Fail ing this, careful 
economic cost-benefit studies could be initiated, to recommend ways o f  phasing them out, and to suggest 
alternative ways o f  achieving objectives such as consumer protection. These principles should be applied 
generally to existing NTBs and also to proposals for new ones. Some o f  the NTBs that have been 
identified in this overview include: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Bangladesh’s 1 i s t  o f  b anned and restricted products, a n d  the institutional holdovers f rom i t s  o ld  
general import licensing system 
Other QRs e.g. Sri Lanka’s bans on imports o f  tea and spices, Nepal’s ban on imports o f  machine 
made woolen yams. 
TRIMS regulations, especially Palustan’s TRIMS applied to i t s  auto industry. 
Palustan’s positive l i s t  for  imports f rom India. T h i s  should be revisited, and when polit ically 
feasible, preferably in conjunction with the relaxation o f  travel, 
communication and other barriers to business relations by both countries. SAFTA (the South Asia 
Free Trade Agreement) signed in January 2004 provides an appropriate and obvious opportunity for 
removing these barriers to  bilateral trade. 
Regulations which prevent or restrict imports o f  second hand goods, especially in India and 
Pakistan. 
expanded or abolished, 
0 
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0 India’s parastatal import monopolies o f  rice, wheat and other agricultural commodities, and i t s  
agricultural TRQs. These are linked, however, to a broader set o f  agricultural/food security policies, 
and removing or phasing out the import barriers would need to be part o f  broader reforms o f  these 
policies. 
State trading import monopolies o f  petroleum products, fertilizers, and others. 
The use o f  sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules and technical regulations to limit imports and 
protect domestic producers. Under the WTO SPS and TBT agreements, these rules are supposed to 
not discriminate between imports and domestic products. It would be in the economic interests o f  
South Asian countries to modi fy  rules that are in fact discriminating (e.g. the Indian B I S  rules) and 
to ensure that new rules are framed and actually applied in a neutral manner. Pro-active domestic 
initiatives to do this would be far preferable to allowing protective SPS and TBT rules to function 
in the expectation that an exporting country will perhaps eventually object at the WTO. 
Restrictions o n  the port and inland Customs posts at which specified products can be cleared. This 
technique has been used by India since 2001 to monitor and restrict imports o f  300 “sensitive” 
products, and independently o f  that, both India and Bangladesh have established quite restrictive 
l is ts  o f  the products which can be c leared at most land border Customs posts. T h e  resulting 
transport costs to reach authorized Customs posts are a major constraint o n  legal bilateral trade in 
the region. 
0 
0 
0 
Tariffs 
Tariffs and protection levels. Tariffs are n o w  the principal means by which the South Asian 
countries protect their domestic industries. Sri Lanka embarked o n  trade liberalization and reduced tariffs 
substantially in t h e  1 ate 1 970s, a n d  c urrently h as t h e  1 owest average tar i f fs in the region. D uring the 
1990s the other four major South Asian countries steadily reduced their tariffs, starting fkom very high 
and in many cases prohibitive levels in the case o f  India, Pahstan and Bangladesh. By about 1997, in 
India and Bangladesh, these tar i f f  reductions started to bite and reached the point  where for an increasing 
number o f  domestically produced products much or most o f  the previous “water” or tar i f f  redundancy had 
been eliminated. This occurred at the same time as a slump in the world prices o f  many commodities and 
manufactured products which accompanied the Asian financial crisis, and, for  India, when it was under 
pressure at the WTO to lift i t s  longstanding QRs o n  consumer goods, which had been in place for about 
40 years, and which for most products were equivalent t o  an import ban. 
This partly explains a five year period between 1997 and 2001 during which there was 
backtracking o n  tar i f f  reform in India, and in Bangladesh a longer period f rom 1995/96 to 2003/04 during 
which there practically n o  further reduction in average total protective tariffs, and big increases in 
protection rates for selected import substitution industries. During 2002, tar i f f  reform in India resumed, 
with successive reductions in industrial (but not agricultural) tariffs in i t s  2002 and 2003 budgets, and a 
final sharp reduction in February 2004. As o f  June 2004, the general maximum protective duties 
(including generally applied para-tariffs as wel l  as Customs duties) which apply to most but not  a l l  
products (there are products subject to higher customs duties than these generally applied maxima) in the 
South Asian countries were estimated as follows: India, 30%; Pahstan 27%; Bangladesh 29%; Sri Lanka 
3 1.25% ; Nepal 29.5%2 
- 
These maxima are those in force in April 2003, and in the case o f  India are the new rates promulgated i t s  2003/04 budget which announced a 
new reduced “maximum” Customs duty of  25%. However, al l  agricultural tariffs were excluded from the reduction and many o f  these as well as 
a large number of  non-agricultural tariffs remain at 30%, and others at rates well above this. 30% therefore has been treated as de facto general 
maximum rate. 
Fo r  explanations o f  these estimated maxima, see Chapter 3 
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Other protective import taxes. Except in India,, Customs duty rates alone give a misleading 
impression o f  actual protection rates for domestic industries, since Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal also employ other 
protective import taxes (para- 
tariffs) which are applied on top 
o f  Customs duties. India was also 
a regular user o f  para-tariffs until 
the last one was dropped in 
February 2004. In Palustan, Sri 
Lanka and Nepal the para-tariffs 
are applied across-the-board to 
a l l  or most tar i f f  lines, but as wel l  
as a general para-tariff o f  this 
type, B angladesh a lso u ses three 
other protective taxes for selected 
products. In addition to this, 
India in particular and to a lesser 
extent Pakistan, Sr i  Lanka and 
Nepal use specific tariffs, which 
can correspond to very high ad 
valorem equivalent rates, 
Fig 3 
Unweighted averages of customs duties plus other 
protective import taxes in 2003 or 2004 
45 - 
40 1 s 35 - 
India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal 
All tariff lines ONon-agriculture Agriculture 
depending o n  import prices. It i s  not  possible to quantify the overall impact o f  the specific tariffs, but 
estimates o f  the unweighted averages o f  the combined protective effect o f  Customs duties and these other 
taxes are shown in Fig 3. According to this indicator, Bangladesh has by far the highest tariffs in South 
Asia. After allowing for para-tariffs, Bangladesh’s average protective rate declined only slightly after 
1995196, f rom 32% to  29% in 2003104, and to 26.5% in 2004105. On average, protective tariffs in the 
other South Asian countries are markedly lower than in Bangladesh. They are about the same in Palustan 
and Nepal and slightly lower in both countries than in India. With the important exception o f  agriculture, 
Sri Lanka i s  a relatively low-to-medium low-tar i f f  country by the general standards o f  developing 
countries. 
Despite the tar i f f  reduction programs carried through in recent years in India and Palustan, 
overall, by wor ld  standards, the South Asian countries are s t i l l  among the more highly protected: except 
for  Sri Lanka, they a l l  come within the  top 20% among 139 developing countries. By this indicator, 
Bangladesh i s  n o w  one o f  the most highly protected developing countries, in one comparison ranlung 
fifth after Tunisia, Morocco, Bahamas and Mauritius. India’s recent tar i f f  reduction program has however 
removed it f rom the group o f  countries with exceptionally high average tariffs. On the other hand India’s 
and Bangladesh’s average agricultural tariffs are respectively seventh and tenth highest (after Tunisia, 
Turkey, Korea and Morocco) among 106 developing countries, and average agricultural tariffs are also 
exceptionally high in Sri Lanka. 
Tari f f  complexity. As we l l  as reducing the tar i f f  levels, past reforms in South Asia have also 
reduced the complexity o f  Customs duties by cutting the number o f  “tariff slabs” i.e. the number o f  
generally applied Customs duties rates. There are now just four normally applied Customs duty rates in 
Pakistan, and including zero, f ive in Bangladesh and Nepal, six in Sri Lanka, and seven in India. But this 
commendable simplification has been undermined by the retention o f  Customs duty rates above the 
normally applied range, and the use o f  specific duties, other protective import  taxes, ad hoc exemptions 
and partial exemptions, and preferential tariffs under SAPTA and other arrangements such as the India- 
Sri Lanka free trade agreement. The resulting continuing complexity i s  most marked in India and 
Bangladesh. In India, specific tariffs n o w  account for  just over 5 percent o f  total tar i f f  lines, there are 17 
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Customs duty rates in excess o f  the normal maximum o f  30 percent, and large numbers o f  exemptions and 
partial exemptions. In Bangladesh the situation i s  even more complex and also opaque, owing to the use 
o f  three other protective taxes o n  top o f  Customs duties, and the deliberate use o f  the VAT system to 
provide extra protection for  selected products by levying VAT when a product i s  imported, but exempting 
the same product f rom VAT when it i s  produced domestically. During 2003/04 the use o f  these taxes and 
devices in Bangladesh increased the unweighted average protection f rom about 18.8 percent (Customs 
duties only) to 29.1% percent i.e. they accounted for more than a third o f  average protection provided by 
Customs duties and other import taxes. More significantly, these taxes (“supplementary duties”, 
“regulatory duties” and the use o f  VAT for protection) were being used to selectively provide very high 
levels o f  protection against imports to domestic production o f  a large number o f  products, in a general 
range o f  between 50 and 100 percent, but going as high as 143 percent (salt) and 131% (sweet biscuits). 
Compared to India and Bangladesh, protective tariffs are much less complex in Palustan, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal. In Palustan imports are subject to an income withholding tax which has some protective effects, 
but the estimated protective incidence o f  that for most products i s  relatively small. There are n o  other 
explicitly protective import taxes other than Customs duties, not  many specific duties, and only a few ad 
valorem rates in excess o f  the general 25% maximum (albeit protecting some large industries) and the 
number and scope o f  ad hoc exemptions has been declining as Customs duties o n  intermediate goods and 
machinery have come down. Sri Lanka and Nepal have some across-the-board but relatively l o w  
protective import ‘taxes which are added to Customs duties. The principal complications are a number o f  
specific duties o n  key commodities in Sri Lanka, and in Nepal a rather large number o f  products subject 
to high Customs duties (40, 80 and 130 percent) which are wel l  above the general maximum o f  25 
percent. 
Tariff e scalation. A s in many other countries, most tariffs in South Asia are systematically 
escalated according to the degree o f  processing involved, with r a w  materials subject to the lowest tariffs, 
processed materials and components subject to higher tariffs, and f inal  consumer goods subject to the 
highest rates. T w o  general consequences o f  this are to provide higher effective protection to the 
processing margins o f  processes further down the chain than to the earlier processes, and to further 
increase the discrimination o f  protective tariffs against exports, unless exports are subsidized. The “tops 
down” approach to tar i f f  reductions that has been typical in South Asia has greatly reduced the extent o f  
escalation by pushing most top Customs duty rates to  lower levels, but it s t i l l  remains a major source o f  
distortions with big differences in effective protection rates both within the import  substitution sectors o f  
these countries, and between import substitution activities and export activities. This i s  a major problem 
even in the manufacturing sectors o f  Sri Lanka and Nepal, where average tariffs are l o w  but the extent o f  
escalation benefiting some processes i s  considerable. Ma in l y  reflecting the greater diversity o f  i t s  
economy, India’s tar i f f  structure i s  much less escalated than the tar i f f  structure o f  the other South Asian 
countries, with most Customs duties concentrated near the top o f  the normal range, but there i s  s t i l l  
considerable potential for very high effective protection rates, in part resulting f rom ad hoc tar i f f  
exemptions for key inputs, and in part fi-om selective above- normal protection rates for finished products 
through the use o f  high tariffs, specific duties, anti-dumping and other means. In Bangladesh, the 
proliferation o f  para-tariffs o n  top o f  Customs duties has enabled a large number o f  import substitution 
industries to escape f rom the reduced protection and the reduced escalation o f  tariffs that otherwise 
would have been the result o f  the descending Customs duty ceiling. At the same time large numbers o f  
tar i f f  reductions for specified uses or  users have been made, mainly o n  r a w  materials and components 
used as inputs, and on machines. The first o f  these trends i s  reflected in the large number o f  Bangladesh’s 
tar i f f  lines with very high total protective rates, and both the f i rst  and second are reflected in the very 
wide dispersion o f t  otal protective rates, which in  2003104 was considerably greater than in  the mid- 
1990s. 
Protection and domestic taxes. In al l  the South Asian countries the share o f  revenue collected 
from VAT-style indirect taxes o n  imports has greatly increased relative to the revenue f rom Customs and 
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other protective taxes o n  imports. Provided that these indirect taxes are collected with equal efficiency at 
the same rates f rom domestic producers, this i s  a highly desirable development since in that cases the 
taxes are broadly neutral and do not favor domestic production. However, if tax collection in the domestic 
economy i s  less comprehensive and rigorous on domestic production than on imports, to an unknown and 
probably haphazard extent the VAT-style indirect tax may operate as another protective import tax. There 
i s  an equivalent issue with “advance income taxes” that are levied on both imports and domestic sales in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Agricultural tariffs. A striking feature o f  South Asian tariffs i s  the very high average levels o f  
agricultural tariffs in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, which in one comparison respectively ranked 
seventh, tenth and twelfth among developing countries. India’s average agricultural tariffs are now just 
slightly below agricultural tariffs in Tunisia, Turkey, Korea, and Morocco. Many  have been increased 
substantially s ince general impor t  1 icensing was removed in  April 2 00 1, a n d  this has b een done e ven 
though some o f  the products are being exported (e.g. tea and coffee, where the protective tariffs are 100 
percent) and even though actual differences between domestic prices and wor ld  prices o f  others are much 
less than the tariffs imposed (e.g. wheat and common rice, where tariffs inclusive o f  S A D  are 
respectively 50 percent and 87.2 percent, even though domestic prices in recent years have generally been 
lower than import prices). Consequently, except for some products (e.g. Indian edible oils), in India and 
Bangladesh, high agricultural tariffs do not  reflect generally high production costs: they rather seem to be 
precautionary measures aimed at maximizing self-sufficiency and continuing insulation o f  agricultural, 
livestock, and associated food processing industries f rom even the slightest disruption f rom l o w  priced 
imports. Unstable wor ld  prices for many agricultural commodities and the perception o f  continuing high 
protection and subsidies for agriculture in the developed countries, reinforce these policies and undercut 
domestic proponents o f  lower tariffs and more open agricultural import policies. These motives are also 
important in Sri  Lanka, but in  this case high tariffs are also protecting very high production costs o f  
marginal fanners producing major crops, in p articular rice, p otatoes, onions a n d  c hilies. B y c ontrast, 
lower average agricultural tariffs and more open agricultural import policies are now in place in Pakistan, 
and in Nepal, even though some Nepalese food processing industries receive high protection. 
Tariffs and government revenue. As tariffs came down in the South Asian countries during the 
late 1980s and 1990s the contribution o f  protective import duties to government revenues diminished as 
well. The decline was less than proportionate to  the reduction in tar i f f  rates, because the share o f  imports 
in GDP grew. But by 2001 a l l  the governments were much less dependent o n  tariffs than they had been 10 
years before, whether measured by tar i f f  revenue in relation to GDP, or tar i f f  revenue as a share o f  total 
government revenue, total tax revenue, or total indirect tax revenue. Subject to the previously discussed 
caveat o n  efficiency in collecting domestic VAT imposts, much o f  this highly desirable lessening o f  
public finance dependence o n  tar i f f  revenue has been due to the introduction o f  trade-neutral taxes, the 
gradual extension o f  their scope, and improvements in the efficiency with which they are administered. 
Nevertheless, this strategic shift f rom import to domestic taxation needs to continue, as protective import 
taxes are a major source o f  distorted incentives and rent seeking behavior. In this regard, comparisons 
with China are highly pertinent. Here import duties are currently less than 3 percent o f  total imports, and 
only around 3-4 percent o f  total (central and provincial) government tax revenues. This compares with 
about 18 percent o f  total imports in India during 2001/01, and 9.5 percent o f  total central and state tax 
revenue. In 2000/2001 protective import taxes were estimated to account for 31 percent o f  total tax 
revenues in Nepal and 27.5 percent in Bangladesh. In these countries, extension o f  the scope and the base 
for domestic taxes and improvements in tax administration, including the administration o f  the Customs 
service, will be especially important for sustaining further tar i f f  reductions. 
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Recommendations on tariffs 
The m a n y  c ontinuing problems with tar i f f  p olicies in S outh A sia suggest that  national re form 
agendas for the future should: 
Make further substantial “tops down ” reductions in the general level of tar$?. The f i rs t  priority 
and biggest economic payoff  will be in Bangladesh, but the resumption o f  tar i f f  reduction 
programs in India Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal i s  also needed to  reduce very high effective 
protection levels that are being provided to some industries which benefit f rom high tariffs on final 
products combined with l o w  intermediate input tariffs. One danger with this process i s  that too 
many exceptions will be made which exclude the production o f  influential f i r m s  and industries 
from the descending ceiling. Another danger i s  that lower level input tariffs will also be reduced, 
thereby maintaining effective protection levels. On the whole, however, the extent to which has 
happened in South Asia has been limited, due to government revenue concerns, and pressure f rom 
local producers o f  intermediates. Consequently, with the notable exception o f  Bangladesh, for the 
most part the “tops down” process has, as intended, squeezed processing margins and created more 
uniform as wel l  as lower tar i f f  structures. 
Eliminate protective import taxes other than Customs duties. India’s abolition o f  i t s  Special 
additional duty (Sadd tax) in February 2004 was a major and highly desirable simplification o f  i t s  
import regime. The protective import taxes that Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are presently 
applying o n  top o f  Customs duties should also either be abolished as part o f  general tar i f f  reduction 
and reform programs, or merged into Customs duties if they are needed for revenue or for other 
reasons. This should be the principal priority for reform in Bangladesh, which uses one general 
para-tariff, two s elective para-tariffs, and the VAT on imports t o  provide v e r y  high 1 evels o f 
nominal tar i f f  protection to favored local producers in distinctly non-transparent ways. The 
protective import taxes in Sri Lanka and Nepal are across-the-board and quite low, and their 
principal purpose i s  to raise revenue rather to provide extra protection. In both cases it would be 
economically more efficient i f  they were also applied to domestic production, either in their present 
form or as supplements to Sri Lanka’s VAT or Nepal’s VAT-sty le indirect taxes. Palustan should 
adjust i t s  income withholding tax on imports so that i t i s  neutral and i s  n o  longer a means o f  
providing extra protection to domestic producers. I t  also needs to review i ts  sales tax o n  imports (a 
VAT-style tax) to ensure that if there are exemptions, that they are applied in a transparent and 
equivalent way to imports as wel l  as domestic production. 
Abolish existing specijic tariffs and abjure their future use. The principal user o f  specific tariffs in 
South Asia i s  India, where most are used to keep out cheap textile fabric and garment imports f rom 
China and other developing countries. One by-product o f  these specific tariffs i s  that i t  i s  very 
difficult or impossible for India’s South Asian neighbors to  compete in the Indian market, even 
with substantial preferential tar i f f  concessions. Specific tariffs are also the principal instrument used 
to provide high protection to  Sr i  Lanka’s import substitution food crops, and are applied to selected 
products in Palustan (e.g to edible oils) and Nepal. Except for some applications where the main 
objective it to raise revenue (e.g. specific duties on petroleum products, alcoholic drinks and 
cigarettes and tobacco), the purpose o f  specific tariffs i s  to provide protection which reduces the 
impact in the domestic economy o f  swings in world prices, and to use non-transparent means that 
frequently gives very high protection, but that does not attract attention owing to the diff iculty o f  
calculating ad valorem equivalent rates. 
Resist making exceptions for particular industries to general tariff ceilings, especially as those 
ceilings come down. This i s  a special problem in India and Bangladesh. In India, the entire 
agricultural sector was excluded f rom the reduction in the maximum Customs duty rate f rom 30% 
to 25% in the 2003104 budget, and f rom the subsequent reduction to 20% in February 2004. There 
are also a large number o f  ad valorem duties, and specific duties with ad valorem equivalents, 
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which greatly exceed the general ceiling rate I t  i s  also a major problem in Bangladesh, where many 
local industries have been given very high tar i f f  protection at rates wel l  above Bangladesh’s general 
ceiling by the use o f  para-tariffs and VAT exemption for domestic producers. I t  i s  also a problem in 
Nepal, where a number o f  local industries are protected by tar i f f  rates wel l  in excess o f  i t s  general 
25% maximum. 
T y  to contain pressures for high agricultural tariffs. As already noted, these pressures are most 
apparent in India and Bangladesh, where average agricultural tariffs are now well above non- 
agricultural tariffs, and where large tar i f f  increases at the f i rs t  s i g n  o f  import competition are being 
routinely given. Similar tendencies are also apparent in Sri Lanka for rice and some other large 
import-substitution crops. 
Move towards more uniform tariffstructures. Tariffs in South Asia are s t i l l  very escalated i.e. they 
go up according to the degree o f  processing. Despite this, the reduction o f  the top rates has reduced 
the extent to which effective protection varies as between different activities. Therefore, as 
recommended previously, the main thrust o f  tar i f f  pol icy should be to press ahead with further 
“tops down” tar i f f  reductions and a by-product will be further reductions in the variance o f  effective 
protection. 
Reduce and ifpossible eliminate the use of exemptions and partial exemptions from standard tariff 
rates. This continues to be a major problem in India and Bangladesh. Apart f rom the increases in 
effective protection that result f rom the exemptions, the system i s  complex, opaque and gives 
excessive discretion to the officials that negotiate and recommend the exemptions. The recent 
experience in Pahstan shows that “tops down” tar i f f  reductions which also involve reduced raw 
material, intermediate input and machinery tariffs, will eventually substantially reduce the demand 
for tar i f f  exemptions. 
Pay special attention to the potential protective effects of domestic taxes which in principle are 
collected both on imports and domestic production. This needs further systematic investigation in 
al l  the South Asian countries to  see whether and to what extent some o f  the apparent reductions in 
protection for domestic industries resulting from tar i f f  cuts, may have been spurious owing to 
imperfect or non-collection o f  domestic VAT-style and other taxes f rom domestic producers. At 
present the shares o f  imports and domestic production in indirect tax revenues are generally not 
reported: this distinction ought be routinely made and trends monitored. The main indirect taxes 
involved are VATS and VAT-style taxes, but other taxes which are applied to both imports and 
domestic transactions could also be important, especially the advance income taxes used in Pahstan 
and Bangladesh. 
Continue efforts to extend the scope and the base for domestic taxes and to improve tax 
administration, including the administration of Customs services. This i s  critical for sustaining 
further tar i f f  reductions and i s  a generally accepted principal throughout South Asia. T o  monitor 
h o w  fast and effectively the South Asian countries are in fact freeing themselves from their 
dependence o n  protective impor t  duties, i t  w ould b e necessary t o  have a s ystematic 1 ook a t  t h e  
sources o f  the domestic taxes which are replacing import duties, checlung in particular that they are 
not  coming disproportionately f rom imports. I t  i s  recommended that this should be a normal part o f  
the financial reporting responsibilities o f  Finance ministries and o f  IMF and Wor ld  Bank 
monitoring o f  the tax and public finance situations o f  the South Asian countries. In particular, 
Finance ministries should focus on this aspect o f  their tax policies by distinguishing and regularly 
reporting the breakdown o f  the various taxes that are collected by Customs. 
Engage a nd m ake t he c ase f or t ariff reduction a nd simplijkation w ith the business, farmer a nd 
other interests groups that are directly affected. In arguing this case for tar i f f  reduction and 
rationalization policies, the main points that are l ikely to be most easily understood and accepted by 
the official-business-farm-politician groups that will need to support or at least accept the changes 
are: (1) l o w  tariffs are needed for local industries to be internationally competitive; (2) l o w  tariffs 
“even the playing field” with export industries; (3) l o w  tariffs simplify Customs clearance and 
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reduce incentives for corruption and smuggling; (4) l o w  tariffs make export tar i f f  
exemptioddrawback mechanisms easier to manage; (5) lower tariffs across the board lead to lower 
exchange rates which offset some o f  the tar i f f  reductions and help exporters. Of course, lower 
tariffs also benefit f inal consumers, but, regrettably, in South Asia as elsewhere, except for some 
basic agricultural commodities, the reality i s  that this general final-consumer (as distinct f rom 
intermediate business consumer) interest in l o w  tariffs has practically n o  weight in discussions and 
negotiations o n  tar i f f  levels. 
Anti-dumping 
The WTO agreements on anti-dumping (AD), countervailing duties (CVD) and safeguards 
provide three GATT-legitimate justifications for giving extra protection against imports at rates which 
exceed bound tariffs. South Asian exports have frequently been harassed by both AD and C V D  measures, 
mostly in developed countries, but none o f  the South Asian countries used anti-dumping until India 
started in 1992/93. Pakistan’s f i rst  AD case was decided in November 2002. Anti-dumping i s  not  being 
used in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Nepal, although there are strong pressures to do so. The lack o f  interest 
in anti-dumping in earlier years was the consequence o f  the highly protectionist policies that were 
followed, which obviated any need for other ways o f  keeping imports out, but as QRs were removed and 
tariffs reduced, AD was seen as an alternative GATT-legitimate way o f  providing protection. 
In India the use o f  AD accelerated after the East Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and the final 
removal o f  traditional import licensing in April 2001. India i s  n o w  one o f  the most active users o f  AD in 
the world. The most targeted country by far has been China, followed by EU, South Korea, Japan, USA, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazi l  in that order. AD duties, which come o n  top o f  
normal import duties, are currently being applied to a wide range o f  intermediate materials and inputs, 
including chemicals and petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, synthetic fibers, and steel and steel products. In 
the past few years, anti-dumping i s  increasingly being used against imports o f  consumer goods. By 
contrast, n o  C V D  and relatively few safeguards cases have been initiated. Most  industries prefer AD to 
safeguards, because it i s  generally more easily obtained, more protective, and longer lasting, and i s  also 
preferred by most administering government authorities, since unlike the safeguard rules, the AD rules 
contain no provisions for compensating the affected exporting countries. 
AD may a ct  a s a s afety v alve w h i c h  a l lows a g ovemment w ishing t o r educe t h e  general level o f 
protection to accommodate lobbying and polit ical pressures which might otherwise build up and 
compromise the general program. This i s  an important motive in India and has been a consideration 
behind the introduction o f  AD in Pakistan. But whether the use o f  AD i s  o n  balance justif ied 
economically then depends on h o w  frequently the safety valve i s  used and on the economic costs 
involved, as against the benefits o f  the trade liberalization that the safety valve makes possible. In order to 
make this judgment, there would need to  be some h o w l e d g e  and understanding o f  the economic 
consequences o f  the AD activity, but in Indian debates o n  economic pol icy there i s  very l itt le awareness 
o f  the scope o f  the AD that has been occurring, let  alone general knowledge o f  i t s  economic effects. For a 
number o f  reasons these effects are l ikely to be serious and highly adverse. 
0 The foreign f i r m s  targeted and penalized by the anti-dumping cases are almost always those that are 
most competitive a n d  have t h e  largest and/or fastest growing market shares among exporters t o  
India. In some cases the f i r m s  appear to have been following normal business practices and 
init ially selling at a discount to establish themselves in the market, but in most cases they have been 
selling at prevailing wor ld  prices, and the AD duties are in practice an extra import  duty o n  top o f  
normal import  duties, not  a tax that brings up the export prices o f  the affected f i r m s  to  the 
prevailing normal  level o f  i ntemational prices. In  b 0th c ases the signal t o  other exporters i s  to 
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charge “reasonable” prices or also face anti-dumping actions, and results in a real terms-of-trade 
loss to India. 
The anti-dumping cases have been greatly increasing the protection o f  industries producing 
numbers o f  important and widely used intermediate materials. The ad valorem equivalents o f  AD 
duties vary f rom about 10 percent to 80 percent, but most are in a range o f  approximately 20 to 50 
percent, implying total import duties on imports f rom foreign f i r m s  subject to the AD duties mostly 
in a range o f  roughly 40 to 70 percent. 
The increased protection and prices o f  intermediates are l ikely to have increased the production 
costs o f  consumer goods just as India was being obliged to remove import  licensing, and has been 
providing arguments and pressures for higher consumer good tariffs, many o f  which are not 
constrained by WTO bindings. 
The anti-dumping cases have been reinforcing the market power o f  highly concentrated Indian 
industries e.g. a study o f  AD cases up to mid-1999 indicated that o f  19 products subject to anti- 
dumping cases in which information i s  provided on the structure o f  the Indian industry, for 11 
products there was only one Indian producer. 
N e w  bureaucratic bodies have been created which have considerable discretionary power over 
India’s trade policies, as wel l  as a whole new specialized service industry o f  accounting and 
economic consultants, technical specialists and lawyers. Whi le formally quite transparent, the 
system i s  ad hoc and distinctly non-transparent in fundamental respects, and has created 
uncertainty for Indian importers and foreign exporters, and many incentives for  rent-seeking 
behavior. 
The extra protection currently being given to domestic industries by Indian anti-dumping measures 
i s  increasing the already considerable vulnerability o f  Indian manufacturing industries to anti- 
dumping actions in their export markets. AD duties in India, added to already high tariffs, allow 
local f i r m s  to increase their domestic prices and thereby increase the“ dumping margins” which are 
the basis for AD duties imposed on Indian exports elsewhere. Even industries which are not 
themselves protected by AD duties may become more vulnerable, to the extent that they raise their 
domestic prices to offset increases in the prices paid for material inputs which are affected by anti- 
dumping duties. 
Recommendations on anti-dumping 
The AD cases already decided in India and the potential for  unrestricted anti-dumping to 
undermine the liberalization o f  the trade regime that has been achieved so far, suggest that a review o f  
current AD policies and practice i s  urgently needed. The present momentum o f  anti-dumping in India 
could be stopped or slowed in a variety o f  ways by one or more o f  the fo l lowing means: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Repealing the AD l aw  and using the safeguards provisions as the main safety valve for responding to 
protectionist pressures. 
Channeling al l  or most cases into the safeguard route and maintaining it as a temporary, short t e r m  
tariff- based instrument to provide extra protection to f i r m s  whi le they adjust. 
Incorporating a buyerkonsumer interest in the AD and safeguards laws, and requiring cases to be 
decided o n  the basis o f  the overall economic costs and benefits o f  imposing duties. 
Explicit ly including an anti-trust type f i l ter  in the AD law, which would make predatory pricing and 
the l ikelihood o f  subsequent market power a precondition for the imposition o f  AD measures. 
Finally, an unfortunate consequence o f  anti-dumping activity in India i s  that producer groups 
looking for ways o f  obtaining extra protection in the neighbouring South Asian countries are using this as 
another reason why their govemments should introduce AD laws and develop the technical capacity to 
implement them. In these discussions the economic costs o f  doing so are almost completely lost or 
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ignored: al l  that i s  being heard i s  that AD i s  a legitimate WTO-sanctioned way o f  dealing with “unfair” 
foreign competitors, and that AD can act as “safety valve” to support more general import liberalization 
objectives. The willingness and interest o f  various intemational and national organizations to provide 
technical assistance to establish AD capabilities in developing countries, makes succumbing to pressures 
to do so much easier. 
So far there are n o  systematic economic evaluations o f  the consequences o f  Indian anti-dumping. 
Some applied, pol icy oriented empirical research on this topic could provide a background which could 
perhaps at least lead to some public questioning o f  AD in India, and which could be salutary for other 
South Asian governments presently under pressure to go down the same path. 
Export  policies 
One very important motive for the trade liberalizations that have occurred in South Asia and that 
are s t i l l  in process, was the b elated recognition that the S outh A sian c ountries had missed o ut o n  the 
spectacular export and general economic expansion that had benefited in particular East Asian and South 
East Asian developing countries during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This point was underlined, especially 
in India, when it became apparent that China’s example showed that export oriented economic growth 
was possible and feasible even for very large countries. There were corresponding changes in attitudes to 
the role o f  exports and to export policies, with a strong pol icy commitment to exports as a growth engine 
at a very early stage in Sri Lanka during the late 1970s, slower recognition and later pol icy commitments 
in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, and despite the installation o f  an extremely elaborate export incentive 
and promotion apparatus, very slow change in basic understanding and attitudes in India. 
This increased recognition in South Asia o f  the positive role o f  exports in economic growth, has 
l ed  to much greater scrutiny of, and efforts to streamline existing export policies and mechanisms, and to 
new export-friendly initiatives. Mos t  o f  these initiatives have had important benefits for other aspects o f  
the economy, not  just exports. In particular: 
I t  was recognized that drawback and other duty neutralization schemes were often cumbersome, 
slow, involved high transaction costs for exporters whi le not fully refunding or exempting duties o n  
imported inputs, had inadequate product coverage, and were subject to abuse. The general response 
was to increase the scope o f  the schemes and broaden their coverage, to build in checks against 
misuse, and to pay attention to the efficiency o f  the Customs and other government services 
involved. 
Direct investment and other roles by foreign f i r m s  in export sectors was seen as a fast and effective 
way o f  acquiring the production and marketing s lu l l s  needed for successful exporting. This was 
especially important in the development o f  the garment export industries in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. The key role o f  foreign f i r m s  in accelerating export growth contributed to more 
supportive general attitudes towards FDI and other forms o f  foreign participation in the South 
Asian economies. 
T o  speed up the development o f  the special s lu l l s  and capabilities needed for successful exporting, 
a wide range o f  supportive export promotion policies and institutions were established. These 
covered things such as support for export marketing, the provision o f  market intelligence, technical 
assistance and training, quality testing and assurance programs, and increasing the availability o f  
pre-shipment and post-shipment credit. 
The efficiency o f  Customs services became a major concern. I t  was recognized that while highly 
inefficient Customs operations were generally good at keeping imports out, they were also 
responsible for  keeping exports in. This concern for efficient, transparent and faster Customs 
clearance in the service o f  exports, was an important motive behind Customs reform programs 
initiated at different times in al l  the South Asian countries. These reforms s t i l l  have a very long way 
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to go, but they can have major general economic benefits beyond the benefits to exporters, most 
directly in reducing transaction costs and delivery times for al l  importers, increasing import 
competition in the domestic economy, and reducing government revenue losses in the face o f  
declining tar i f f  rates. 
In support o f  these objectives, but also reflecting considerable inertia inherited f rom past policies, 
the South Asian countries are n o w  operating a large number o f  extremely diverse and not always 
internally consistent policies which affect exports. They  can b e  grouped into ( i) policies that  restrict 
exports, such as export controls and export taxes; (ii) policies that subsidize exports, both directly and 
indirectly; (iii) import duty neutralization schemes, that exempt or refund import  duties on inputs used by 
exporters; (iv) export zones and bonded warehouse schemes that provide duty exemption and other 
benefits in one package; (v) export promotion and quality control policies and organizations; and (vi) 
export incentive and promotion schemes tailored for particular products or industries. 
India has the most comprehensive and complex set o f  export policies. This i s  because, compared 
to t h e  o ther c ountries, it has a m u c h  1 arger and more  diversif ied e conomy, that  i t  h as b een s lower t o  
liberalize i t s  import regime, and that i t s  import policies are consequently more protective and 
comprehensive. At the other extreme, Sri Lanka’s export regime i s  fairly simple, reflecting i t s  generally 
l o w  tariffs o n  intermediates (including free trade in textiles) and capital goods, absence o f  QRs, and 
export specialization, especially in garments and plantation crops. Of  the other three countries, 
corresponding to similar differences in their import policies, the most complex and comprehensive export 
regime i s  in Bangladesh, followed by Pakistan and Nepal. 
Despite the emphasis o n  export facilitation and promotion, a surprisingly large number o f  
products are s t i l l  subject to restrictive export policies. These include export bans and licensing, 
government export monopolies, and export taxes. Most  o f  the direct controls are in India and Bangladesh: 
there are only a few in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The major motive i s  to ensure local availability and 
suppress domestic prices, either in the interests o f  f inal consumers (e.g. onions and pulses in India and 
Bangladesh) or domestic intermediate consumers (farmer purchasers o f  subsidized fertilizers in India), or 
o f  indirectly subsidizing exports o f  products further down the production chain e.g. Bangladesh’s ban on 
the export o f  animal hides and sluns subsidizes production and exports o f  processed leather products. 
There are also export taxes o n  some products in India and Pakistan, and Nepal imposes export taxes o n  23 
products and in addition a general export tax o f  2.75% consisting o f  a 0.75% turnover tax and a defense 
tax o f  2% imposed in 2001. 
Across-the-board direct export subsidies are n o  longer being used, but ad-hoc direct subsidies and 
a large variety o f  indirect export subsidies are employed, especially by India, Palustan and Bangladesh. 
For  example, since early 2001 India has been subsidizing exports o f  large excess stocks o f  wheat and 
rice; Bangladesh subsidizes exports o f  garments which use domestic fabrics; S r i  Lanka subsidizes exports 
o f  chicken meat; Pakistan provides a general 25% freight subsidy; India, Palustan and Bangladesh 
provide transport and marketing subsidies to agricultural exports. Other indirect export subsidies are 
through directed credit and credit subsidies, government export credit guarantee funds, income and 
corporate tax exemptions or reductions l inked to exports, a n d  grants a n d  other subsidies t o  small and  
medium exporters. 
Overall, the general trade policies and the export policies o f  the South Asian countries have 
become much more supportive o f  the participation o f  their exporters in wor ld  markets than they were 
during the earlier import substitution period. The crucial pol icy developments behind this change have 
been the liberalization o f  import regimes through the removal o f  QRs and the reduction o f  tariffs, and the 
provision o f  facilities for exporters to enable them to operate outside or bypass the import  regimes. Other 
government pro-export initiatives such as the activities o f  export promotion organizations have also been 
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helpful, but conducive trade policies are a necessary condition for these to be effective. As a result o f  
these reforms, anti-export bias in manufacturing, agriculture and for services, understood as incentives for 
exports relative to incentives for  import substitution production, has declined substantially throughout the 
region. 
Nevertheless, anti-export bias i s  s t i l l  a serious concem, especially in Bangladesh. Following i t s  
recent tar i f f  reductions, i t has declined but i s  s t i l l  a concern in India, and also (although to a lesser 
extent) in Palustan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, where import regimes are less protective and complex. As long 
as there i s  tar i f f  or other forms o f  protection for production to supply domestic markets, even i f export 
mechanisms and institutions such as drawback, duty exemption for exporters and export processing zones 
were to operate smoothly without transaction costs for exporters, overall the incentives for exports are 
generally lower. This has been frequently demonstrated by empirical studies in South Asia, most recently 
by a comprehensive firm-level study in Bangladesh which found much higher effective protection rates 
for  domestic market production than for exports. 
Another concem i s  that the multitude o f  duty neutralization schemes and institutions, export 
restrictions and taxes, direct and indirect export subsidies, export promotion initiatives and other policies 
have a very uneven but unknown incidence as between different export activities, and could be creating 
inefficiencies within the export sectors. 
In practice the transaction costs for exporters that use duty neutralization schemes can be 
considerable, and in a system with high and complex protective tariffs and other instruments, export 
policies and mechanisms which provide for exemptions and refunds so that exporters can function 
profitably, have been a major focus for lobbying and corrupt practices, involv ing both the Customs 
service and the other government agencies responsible for  the export policies. These rent seeking 
activities generate various checks and controls, which in tum slow down and reduce the accessibility o f  
the system, especially for  small and new exporters. Despite improvements in the administration o f  these 
schemes, aided most recently by the introduction o f  c omputer technology and internet links, a recent 
(200 1) official Indian report makes it clear that serious administrative problems remain, with complaints 
o f  delays and harassment by Customs officials on the part o f  exporters, complaints f rom Customs 
officials o f  dishonest practices by businessmen involved in exporting, and conflicts between Customs and 
Ministry o f  Commerce officials. In 2001 there was major corruption scandal in India involving falsely 
documented export containers shipped in  order t o  obtain export incentive p ayments, a n d  similar large 
scale corruption scandals involv ing Bangladesh’s export incentive system have also been reported e.g. in 
2002 an investigation that i s  alleged to have involved a number o f  nonexistent textile mills that obtained 
export subsidies based on nonexistent exports. These episodes indicate that as long as there are economic 
rents inherent in export incentive systems, there are l ikely to be continuing problems in one form or 
another. The surest way to reduce their severity and the brake they constitute to export expansion, is to 
continue to liberalize imports and to reduce theprotection of the domestic market, thereby reducing the 
incentives for misuse and rent seeking behavior. 
Recommendations on export policies 
The environment for  exporters in South Asia has greatly improved with the general trade policy, 
export pol icy and institutional reforms that have been implemented during the past 25 years. 
Nevertheless, there are economic inefficiencies associated with current policies which should continue to 
be addressed. These are most marked in India and Bangladesh as a result o f  their complex protective 
structures, less so in Pakistan and Nepal, and are less serious again but s t i l l  a concern in Sri Lanka. It i s  
suggested that the appropriate ways to deal with these inefficiencies may include the following: 
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Remove non-tariffbarriers to imports and reduce tariffs. This i s  fundamental and by far the most 
important single pro-export reform because (i) it increases the relative attractiveness for businesses to 
invest and produce for export rather than for the domestic market; (ii) the resulting increases in imports 
will tend to devalue the exchange rate and make investing and producing for export more attractive than it 
otherwise would be; (iii) import duty neutralization schemes are easier to manage and involve lower 
transaction costs the lower are the tariffs that need to be rebated or exempted; (iv) with lower input tariffs, 
excessive or inadequate exemptions or refunds will create smaller differences between the net incentives 
for different exported products; (v) lower input tariffs and therefore lower drawback and other rebates 
reduce the incentives for negotiation between exporters and their agents, and Customs and other officials, 
and at the same time reduce the incentives for corrupt practices such as over-invoiced or misclassified 
export shipments. 
Set and stick to f i rm upper limits to domestic market protection and subsidies. This means 
resisting pressures to make exceptions to general rules by providing extra protection or subsidies above 
general norms. Otherwise, if it i s  known that policymakers can be easily persuaded to help with extra ad 
hoc incentives for supplying the domestic market, investors wil l find this lund o f  investment more 
attractive than the r isks and difficulties they are l ike ly  to face in export markets. In this regard 
Bangladesh’s para-tariffs are probably especially damaging for investment in efficient export expansion, 
since their proliferation suggests that there has been litt le resistance to their introduction. Hence, reining 
in the use o f  the para-tariffs should be a major priority for  the country’s export growth and economic 
expansion. 
Reduce the complexity oft he tariff and import tax s tructure, especially by e liminating import 
taxes other than Customs duties. Together with tar i f f  reduction, reforms to simplify tar i f f  structures 
reduce the administration and transaction costs o f  import duty neutralization schemes for exporters, and 
reduce the advantages o f  and need for special arrangements and institutions such as export processing 
zones, bonded warehouses etc 
Abolish or phase out non-tariff barriers to exports. Leaving aside restrictions that are imposed for 
religious, cultural, environmental and similar reasons, most non-tariff export restrictions imposed to 
influence trade and production are in India and Bangladesh. L i k e  non-tariff import barriers, there are 
sound economic reasons that they are proscribed (with some exceptions) by the GATT. In South Asia, 
they are generally crude and non-transparent techniques for subsidizing consumers, or more often inputs 
used by domestic producers including exporters. In the latter case careful analysis will usually show that 
they provide excessive but also variable and unreliable indirect subsidies to downstream producers 
accompanied by a variety o f  transaction and spillover costs e.g. leather and shoe producers using animal 
hides the export o f w hich i s b anned, o r  furniture producers u sing 1 oca1 logs a n d  t imber the export o f 
which i s  banned or restricted. There are generally substantial net economic benefits f rom abolishing them, 
and if for some reason the subsidies they confer are to be maintained, i t i s  generally better to do this by 
the use o f  ad valorem export taxes rather than by the use o f  discretionary controls. In some cases, 
however (e.g. India’s ban on fertilizer exports) the restrictions are part o f  a set o f  much more far reaching 
policies a n d  c hanging o r  r emoving them w ould n eed t o b e considered in the c ontext o f m ore g eneral 
reforms o f  these policies. 
Abolish or phase out export taxes. The export taxes currently being used in South Asia (e.g. in 
Nepal) provide a simpler and more efficient and transparent means o f  achieving some o f  the apparent 
objectives o f  export bans and controls, but l ike export NTBs careful analysis will almost always show 
that their economic costs exceed their economic benefits. I t  i s  very di f f icul t  to make a convincing case for 
export taxes, whether applied to  just some products or across-the-board, if, as i s  true in al l  the South 
Asian countries, incentive systems are already heavily biased against exports. As with export NTBs, there 
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should be a presumption favoring their abolition, unless a convincing argument can be made to retain 
them in individual cases. 
Ensure that eflcient mechanisms are in place to exempt or refund VAT- style and other indirect 
taxes on exported products and on inputs used by exporters. Even if tariffs are reduced to l o w  levels or to 
zero, there i s  s t i l l  a need to free exports f rom indirect taxes which will generally s t i l l  be charged on 
imports and domestic transactions even under free trade. I t  i s  important that this i s  achieved smoothly 
either through the domestic indirect tax administration or by allowing for these taxes in pr ior  exemption, 
drawback and other arrangements managed by Customs. 
Avoid using direct export subsidies and cut back on the use of indirect export subsidies. There i s  
general theoretical case for paying export subsidies on the grounds that they are needed to make exporting 
more attractive by balancing the protection to import substitution production resulting f rom tariffs, but 
this would require across-the-board subsidies applicable to al l  exportables (including agricultural and 
mineral products) comparable in scope to typical tar i f f  schedules that tax a l l  imports. Since export 
subsidy policies o f  this scope are economically and polit ical infeasible and have never been attempted 
(certainly not  in South Asia), a much more efficient, simple and effective way o f  reducing the disparities 
between import substitution and export incentives i s  to reduce tariffs. In addition, as employed in South 
Asia, both the direct and indirect export subsidies are being applied unevenly to  a l imi ted range o f  
products in a haphazard manner, creating large and economically inefficient disparities in the net export 
incentives (effective rates o f  subsidy) between products. Many also involve high administration and 
transaction costs relative to the subsidies that are disbursed (e.g. subsidized export credit, export tax 
holidays, subsidized export credit guarantees, matching grants for new exporters, transport and marketing 
subsidies ) as part o f  efforts to  limit their misuse and diversion to non-export activities. I t  i s  also highly 
relevant that export subsidies are banned or discouraged by WTO agreements, for good reasons as they 
both disrupt wor ld  trade and are generally not  in the interests o f  the countries which pay them. 
Finally, l ike other developing countries, the South Asian countries have an interest in supporting 
not only rhetorically but by their own policies, the efforts embodied in the WTO agreements and 
negotiations to  reign in developed country export subsidies and to reduce the danger o f  future 
international export subsidy wars in which they could not hope to compete with the developed countries. 
In this regard India’s big export subsidies during the past few years o n  large volumes o f  wheat and rice 
exported f rom i t s  government held surplus stocks, seem to be violating the spirit o f  one o f  the key 
elements o f  the Agreement o n  Agriculture, and to be compromising India’s own medium and long term 
interest in more open and less distorted wor ld  markets for these and other agricultural commodities. 
Regional Trade and Preferential Trading Arrangements 
With the exception o f  the trade o f  Nepal and Bhutan with India, and the trade o f  the Maldives 
with Sri Lanka, South Asia’s past import  substitution trade policies restricted intra-regional trade even 
more than trade with the rest o f  the world. Fol lowing independence f rom British rule, trade o f  the newly 
independent countries with each other fe l l  f rom about 19 percent o f  their total trade in 1948, to around 4 
percent by the end o f  t h e  1 950s and to o n l y  2 percent by 1967. This very l o w  share o n l y  began to 
increase during the 199Os, as the general trade pol icy liberalizations in the individual countries began to 
take hold. 
There are a large number o f  multilateral and bilateral regional trade agreements (RTAs) in South 
Asia: the Bangkok Agreement, the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), and the India-Sri 
Lanka, India-Nepal, India-Bhutan, and Bangladesh-Bhutan trade agreements. The Bangkok Agreement 
includes India, Bangladesh and Sr i  Lanka, and also four non-South Asian countries, Thailand, Republic 
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o f  Korea, Laos and China (the latter since 2001). However, the size and scope o f  preferences have been 
very l imited and it has had practically n o  impact on trade between the member countries. 
For a number o f  years, there were discussions o n  a bilateral FTA between India and Bangladesh, 
and another between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Following a number o f  years o f  negotiation and delays, 
improved relations between India and Pahstan led to the signing o f  the South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA) in January 2004. I t  i s  planned that SAFTA’s trade provisions will come into force 
in January 2006 and that they will be fully implemented by December 2016. In the meantime the SAPTA 
and various other RTA commitments are to continue alongside whatever i s  done under SAFTA. 
Until about end-1998, the regional trade agreements (RTAs) involv ing the larger countries had 
minimal impact o n  regional trade. The only arrangements which have supported large volumes o f  trade 
for peripheral countries have been India-Nepal and India-Bhutan. But this trade has been tiny in relation 
to India’s total trade. The reasons for the minimal impact during earlier years o f  the RTAs on trade 
between the larger South Asian countries have included: 
0 
0 
The extreme reluctance to make any meaningful concessions in the earlier years (e.g. Bangkok 
agreement, the f i rst  SAPTA rounds) 
The polit ical problems between India and Pakistan, exemplified by Palustan’s positive l i s t  o f  products 
which can be imported f romIndia.  This relationship has hamstrung SAPTA and led al l  the South 
Asian counties to look for  bilateral free or preferential trade agreements with each other. 
India’s import licensing system which (except for a few bulk commodities which were imported by 
parastatal monopolies) continued to effectively ban imports o f  a l l  consumer goods from a l l  
destinations. The ban was l i f ted (for the SAPTA countries only) in 1998. I t  finally disappeared for 
the rest o f  the wor ld  in April 2001. 
0 The controls o f  India’s agricultural parastatals over imports and exports o f  major primary 
commodities 
0 
Regional trade expanded rapidly during the late 1980s and 1990s, principally due to unilateral 
trade 1 iberalization by t h e  South A sian countries o n India’s p eriphery, a n d  large appreciations o f the  
exchange rates o f  the peripheral countries relative to the Indian rupee. Mos t  o f  the increased trade was 
one way, with large increases in exports f rom India, especially to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, but it had 
litt le or nothing to do with regional tar i f f  preferences. Since 1999, however, the potential for RTA- 
induced increases in regional trade has increased, mainly due to: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
the increased product coverage o f  SAPTA concessions, 
the abolition in August 1998 o f  India’s consumer good QRs o n  imports f rom SAPTA countries. 
the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
in the longer term, S A F T A  
Since the late 1990s, the expansion o f  regional trade has continued, but at a considerably slower 
rate, and as during the 1990s, it has mostly consisted o f  exports to the peripheral countries f rom India. 
Since the signing o f  the bilateral India-Sri Lanka FTA (ILFTA), Sr i  Lankan exports to India have 
increased quite rapidly, but f i o m  an extremely small starting point. Overall, in absolute terms, there have 
been only minor increases in Indian imports f rom the other South Asian count ies during the past f ive or 
six years, and the share o f  the peripheral countries in India’s total trade remains tiny (about one percent) 
and has not  increased during the past six years. 
However, the increased regional formal exports f rom India, most o f  which have been subject to 
normal MFN tariffs or very l o w  preferences, has improved economic welfare in the region, especially in 
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Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and in India as a result o f  the expansion o f  Indian exports. Many imported 
Indian products are better adapted to the requirements o f  buyers in the other South Asian countries than 
imports f rom outside the South Asia region. But nearly a l l  the increased trade has been in products for 
which there are n o  or few preferential tariffs under SAFTA or the other RTAs. This i s  because 
Bangladesh’s tar i f f  preferences are very small and cover only a l imi ted number o f  products, whi le Sri 
Lanka’s preferences are more extensive and larger in proportional terms, but are mostly allowed on 
products for which MFN tariffs are already very low.  India has provided much larger proportionate 
preferences over a wider range o f  products (both under SAPTA and the bilateral FTA with Sri Lanka), 
but for reasons that are not wel l  understood, the import response has been very minor. Possible reasons 
include r ules o f o rigin constraints, quotas o n  some k e y  products o f i nterest to Sri L anka, a n d  various 
informal and transaction costs in clearing Indian Customs , but more general factors including supply 
constraints in the peripheral countries and highly competitive conditions in some Indian domestic markets 
are probably more important. 
Because many tariffs in the region are very high, especially in India and Bangladesh, there are 
large potential trade diversion costs for the region as a whole if the various preferential trade agreements 
including SAFTA were to be implemented in a comprehensive way. The consequent reductions in 
economic welfare would show up principally in reduced customs revenue and terms-of-trade losses. I t  i s  
unlikely that benefits through increased competition, economies o f  scale, or improved operating 
efficiency o f  import competing f i r m s  would outweigh these overall economic costs. There are much 
larger gains f rom increased trade with the rest o f  the wor ld  (ROW), especially trade with the developed 
countries and with more advanced developing countries in South East and East Asia, including China. 
This i s  because the South Asian countries have comparative advantage in relation to ROW in similar, 
mostly labor intensive products, and the volume o f  trade and the economic benefits f rom trading these 
products among themselves are l imited by comparison. 
For  a l l  these reasons the South Asian countries as a group would do much better economically if 
each o f  them were to give first priority to increasing their trading integration with the rest o f  the world, 
rather than to the pursuit o f  regional preferential arrangements. The way to do this would be to reduce 
their tariffs and other forms o f  protection generally o n  an MFN basis, thus increasing the shares o f  both 
imports and exports in their economies, including imports and exports f rom their neighbors. This would 
also reduce the l ikelihood o f  economic losses and improve their individual prospects o f  benefiting f rom 
regional agreements to which they are committed, in particular SAFTA. 
I t  i s  possible that individual South Asian countries might benefit f rom more thoroughgoing 
regional preferential arrangements, even i f the region taken as whole might lose. Insofar as regional 
preferential trade arrangements such as ILFTA and SAFTA continue and become effective, a South Asian 
country that liberalizes and moves to lower general (MFN) protection levels (e.g. a country such as Sri 
Lanka) would also lose less f rom the preferential arrangements, and could stand to gain substantially on 
balance if other South Asian countries (e.g. India) remain highly protected and are willing to accord 
significant preferences to imports f rom the region. This could happen if polit ical considerations favoring 
preferential arrangements override economic considerations, in the case o f  countries which open up to 
preferential imports f r o m  the region even though remaining highly protected v i z  a v iz  the rest o f t  he 
world. Otherwise, i t i s  perhaps unlikely to occur, since the same industries and interests that resist 
reductions in general protection levels are l ikely to also resist reduced protection against imports f rom 
RTA countries. Hence it would be a tactical mistake for countries such as Bangladesh to delay general 
trade liberalization in the hope that doing so would improve their eventual access to, and the tar i f f  
preferences they receive, in the markets o f  protected RTA member such as India. 
Although the  o vera11 economic b enefits f o r  the r egion a s a whole, o f  increased r egional trade 
spurred by tar i f f  preferences are doubtful, the removal o f  barriers which explicitly discriminate against 
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regional trade would unambiguously improve regional economic welfare. An example i s  the Pakistan ban 
o n  a l l  imports f rom India except for products on Palustan’s 677-item positive l i s t  and by measures on 
both sides that restrict transport links, business travel, and business contacts o f  a l l  kinds. Removing this 
discrimination would increase economic welfare in both countries. T o  take a single example, periodically 
(as during 2000/2001) Pakistan imports wheat f rom world markets rather than buying from the large 
surplus stocks nearby in India. Selling these stocks to Palustan could reduce prices and benefit Pakistan 
consumers, while at the same time increasing economic welfare in India by reducing the subsidies 
involved in exporting surplus wheat to other countries and reducing the costs o f  holding wheat stocks, 
including the cost o f  the substantial quantities o f  wheat that are lost in substandard storage. Rice exports 
f rom India to Bangladesh in equivalent circumstances have benefited both countries, and more generally, 
the whole region would benefit f rom region-wide markets in grains and other commodities, provided that 
trade with the rest o f  the wor ld  were also open and unimpeded. 
A 1996 GOP study found that the economic benefits to Pakistan o f  removing this impediment to 
trade with India would outweigh the costs. T w o  principal groups, consumers (lower prices) and the 
govemment (greater customs duty revenue f rom legalizing i l l ic i t  border trade), would benefit f rom such 
liberalization. Important segments o f  producers would also benefit because o f  increased competitiveness 
and market access to the much larger Indian economy. Inefficient producers would need to restructure 
and increase competitiveness to stay in the market. 
More  generally, initiatives to facilitate regional trade by improving such things as transport links, 
communications, market intelligence, regional trade financing, Customs and internal tax cooperation, 
regional travel for traders and other businessmen, and many others would clearly be welfare enhancing 
for the region, whether achieved under SAARC/SAFTA or other auspices. Regional organizations have a 
key role quite independently and separately f rom the question o f  the economic desirability o f  regional 
tar i f f  preferences. 
Recommendations on regional trade and preferential arrangements in South Asia 
Give priority to trading integration with the wor ld  as whole through further general trade 
liberalization on an MFN basis 
Recognize the potential substantial economic costs to the economy if substantial tar i f f  preferences are 
given when MFN tariffs are high 
Recognize that there could be potential substantial economic gains for a country f rom preferential 
arrangements provided the country’s own tariffs are l o w  and the partner country or countries have 
high tariffs but despite that are willing to provide substantial preferences with non-constraining rules 
of origin. But also recognize that the same interests that resist general MFN trade liberalization in the 
partner country are also l ikely to resist or obstruct substantial meaningful preferences that would 
create substantial competing imports resulting f rom the tar i f f  preferences. 
Do not  delay unilateral MFN liberalization as a way o f  obtaining more favorable preferences from 
regional preferential trading partners. 
When polit ically possible, remove or  reduce sources o f  positive discrimination against regional trade. 
Specifically, the SAFTA framework and commitment would seem to  provide an opportunity for 
Palustan to formally accord MFN status to India by abolishing i t s  positive l i s t  o f  products that can be 
imported f rom India, and for both countries to remove restrictions o n  travel and commercial contacts 
which hinder trade between them. 
Pursue bilateral and regional initiatives to improve the general conditions for regional trade, including 
transport, communication, market intelligence, storage, travel rules and facilities, Customs procedures 
and cooperation, financing and many others. 
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Special Treatment for Problem industries 
“Eyesores” such as Pakistan Steel, the Palustan auto and motorcycle assembly industries; sections 
of the steel and urea fertilizer industries in India, and others that have gained large state subsidies and/or 
high protection against import  competition abound in South Asia. In India and Palustan edible o i l  
processing benefits f rom such protection, as do textile fabric industries in India and Bangladesh, the 
Indian and Pakistan auto industries, many import substitution consumer good producers in Bangladesh, 
rice, potato, onion and c h i l i  growing in Sri Lanka. In many cases, the strongest resistance to policy 
reform comes f rom public sector f i r m s  and govemment ministries and departments that oversee the PSUs 
and the industry generally, e.g., in India, the public sector firm S A I L  (Steel Authority o f  India) and the 
Ministry o f  Steel; the public sector firm National Textile Corporation and the Ministry o f  Textiles; and 
the joint  public sector/Suzuki firm Marut i  Udyog and the DGFT (Directorate General o f  Foreign Trade) 
in the Ministry o f  Commerce and Industry (responsible for the recently terminated auto local content 
(“indigenisation”) program. A s  in other countries, the role o f  Ministries o f  Agriculture in South Asia i s  
the promotion and protection o f  the interests o f  farmers and farming activities. This generally includes al l  
farm and livestock activities, including those receiving high protection, although some farmers will 
typically have more influence than others, depending o n  their lobbying strength and polit ical clout. 
India’s National Textile Corporation (NTC) i s  a good example o f  a firm with a large and 
influential workforce -- over 100,000 workers in about 120 textile mills - that would have trouble 
adjusting to liberalizing reforms. As an indication o f  the polit ical sensitivity o f  adjustment in this 
industry, during the many years when the Indian textile market was completely insulated from import 
competition, initiatives to finally close down and sell o f f  the assets o f  patently unviable N T C  mills have 
either not been pursued or explicit ly rejected (e.g. in 2000 at Cabinet level). Another example in India i s  
SAIL, which operates five integrated steel mills, some o f  which would not  be viable with open 
competition, and which has a total workforce o f  about 148,000, which far exceeds the appropriate 
workforce for i t s  total steel production. 
In thinlung about problem industries and what to do about them in the context o f  trade pol icy 
reform, especially in South Asia, i t i s  important to recognize that high protection through high tariffs may 
not be protecting correspondingly high production costs, at least in the entire protected sector. For 
example, auto tariffs in India are 60%, yet the largest domestic producer Marut i  and other jo in t  venture 
car manufacturers have emerged as major exporters to wor ld  markets, and domestic ex-factory auto 
prices for smaller cars in India are l o w  by wor ld  standards and appear to be not  far out o f  l ine with export 
prices. Likewise, grain and other agricultural tariffs in India are high, but domestic grain prices not far 
above or below import parity prices. In cases such as these, with greatly redundant tariffs, tar i f f  
reductions may involve l i t t le o f  n o  adjustment o f  domestic production. If this i s  the case, as a general 
principle i t i s  especially important to get very high tariffs down as soon as feasible, because even if most 
o f  the industry i s  competitive, the high tariffs are l ikely to be sheltering pockets o f  high cost production, 
and if maintained for long periods, they have the potential to pull more resources into these and other high 
cost market segments, increasing the adjustment costs and the resistance to reform if it i s  put o f f  to a later 
time. 
Where line ministries and other govemment entities with long established interests in industry 
controls preside over protected industries, pol icy reform faces added obstacles. As with any lund of 
reform, in some circumstances, in order to push trade pol icy reform effectively, rather than directly 
threatening the regulatory roles and therefore the jobs o f  the bureaucrats and the influence o f  ministers, it 
may be more effective to attempt to change their roles f rom regulating the industry to restructuring and 
promoting it. This appears to be the current strategy in the Indian Ministry o f  Textiles, for example, which 
since 1999 has been in charge o f  a “Technology Upgradation Fund” scheme, which aims to help the 
power loom section o f  the industry face up to the MFA phase out and the removal o f  India’s remaining 
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textile and garment QRs which occurred in April 2001, Likewise, the Bangladesh Ministry o f  Commerce 
has, though belatedly, completed an in-depth study o f  the RMG sector, in order to formulate a strategy to 
face up to the challenge o f  MFA phase out. 
I t  i s  critical, therefore, to ensure that what i s  done in the name o f  strategic policies for promoting 
a dynamic sector do not give r ise  to interventions that actually slow down or prevent the abandonment o f  
o ld  regulatory controls, and do not introduce new types o f  planning and regulation that primarily expand 
the role o f  the bureaucracy. 
Recommendations on problem industries 
0 Do not  ho ld back general reforms such as tar i f f  or subsidy reductions to protect particular problem 
industries or f i r m s .  Rather, go ahead with the reforms and develop separate programs to deal with the 
problem areas. 
Rather than threatening the existence o f  Ministries or other government organizations associated with 
the problem industries or f irms, try to give them a role in the adaptation o f  the industries or f i r m s  to 
the new competitive environment, including restructuring, modernization but also closure and dealing 
with the resulting employment and other disruptions. 
Where feasible and economically appropriate, help to create conditions in which fast growth o f  other 
f i r m s  or industries can help absorb some o f  the employees f rom the restructured or closed industries 
or f i r m s .  
Do not  delay cutting tariffs or other forms o f  protection o n  the grounds that the protected producers 
are efficient and not  using the protection to charge high prices or perform poorly. 
0 
0 
0 
Trade policy reform and the WTO 
The motivations and original impetus for trade liberalization in the South Asian countries had 
litt le to do with the GATT, and reforms got under way we l l  before the conclusion o f  the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and the establishment o f  the WTO in 1995. Nevertheless, since 1995 the WTO rules and 
institutions have contributed directly to further trade liberalization, have helped tie in reforms once they 
were made, and have greatly improved transparency and the accessibility o f  relevant knowledge. 
The dispute in which the US, the EU and a number o f  other WTO members successhlly challenged 
India’s right to maintain a large number o f  QRs under GATT Article XVIII (B), at the very least 
hastened their demise, and may have been a necessary condition for  them to  be dropped at all. A 
similar, earlier dispute in which a WTO panel found against a number o f  QRs then being operated by 
Sri Lanka made it clear, both in Sri Lanka and in the other South Asian countries, that the routine use 
o f  traditional QRs to protect local industries was n o  longer feasible. 
Complaints o f  other WTO members under the TRIMS agreement, eventually resulted in the removal 
o f  local c ontent o r  “ indigenisation” schemes in the P akistan engineering industries a n d  the Ind ian  
auto industry. 
Bindings o f  non-agricultural tariffs have constrained tar i f f  increases that might otherwise have 
occurred, principally in India where a fairly large number o f  tariffs were bound at 25% or 40%, but 
less so in the other South Asian countries where there have been very few bindings. 
The phaseout o f  the MFA has motivated efforts to improve the efficiency and competitiveness o f  the 
textile and clothing sectors o f  the South Asian countries through more open and less interventionist 
policies. 
The WTO Information Technology (IT) Agreement has been a major influence in the removal o f  QRs 
and tar i f f  reductions for these products in India, where it has reinforced decisions to liberalize imports 
o f  computers and computer related equipment, which was a sine que non for the rapid growth o f  the 
software industry and software exports 
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0 The Agreement on Agriculture has had litt le direct impact o n  national agricultural trade and other 
policies in South Asia, but has made these policies much more transparent, especially the 
requirements for tariffs-only protection and to a lesser extent, the reporting requirements on things 
such as subsidies and price support, state trading and SPS. 
Acceding countries generally face more rigorous WTO membership conditions than established 
members, a n d  this has a ffected Nepal, w h i c h  has b ound a 11 i t s  t ariffs, b 0th agricultural a n d  n on- 
agricultural, at l o w  levels, and has committed itself to phase out i t s  para-tariffs. Hence Nepal’s trade 
policies are tied in by WTO commitments that are considerably more comprehensive and 
constraining than the commitments o f  India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. 
Bhutan i s  l ikely to face a similar situation when it eventually joins. 
The periodic WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) reports are providing extremely comprehensive yet 
compact descriptions o f  each country’s trade policies and institutions in a consistent framework that 
permits comparisons with other countries, This is a major advance o n  the situation before the TPR 
reports were instituted (see for example the excellent 2002 TPR reports o n  India and Palustan). Many 
new developments in national trade policies in South Asia can be easily followed on the W T O  
website by looking at the reports required to be submitted to the various WTO committees. 
0 
0 
Recommendations on trade policy reforms and the WTO 
Although WTO membership involves accepting some external constraints which favor more open 
and liberal trade policies, for established members the extent to which WTO membership i s  used in this 
way i s  largely up to the countries themselves. The WTO negotiating positions o f  the South Asian 
countries h ave b een ve ry  mercantilist, resisting pressures f o r  tighter disciplines o n  their o wn p olicies, 
pressing for exemptions o n  the grounds o f  “special and differential treatment” for developing countries, 
and focusing o n  further liberalization in the developed countries. One result o f  the mercantilist orientation 
o f  public debate and perceptions o f  the WTO in South Asia i s  that many opportunities that the WTO 
framework provides to promote and tie in more open national trade policies are being missed. In 
particular: 
0 Most  non-agricultural tar i f fs in Palustan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are unbound. I t  would be in 
these countries’ interests to bind these tariffs at l o w  levels as a discipline against backtrackmg and 
arbitrary tar i f f  increases. This also applies to the large number o f  Indian non-agricultural tar i f f  l ines 
that are unbound. 
Except in Sri Lanka and Nepal and a few products in India, nearly a l l  agricultural tar i f f  bindings in 
South Asia have been set at very high- to- prohibitive levels. I t  would be appropriate to substantially 
reduce them unilaterally and independently o f  the tar i f f  bargaining that i s  occurring as part o f  the 
ongoing WTO negotiations. 
Bangladesh has on the whole successfully argued that i t s  “least developed” status should permit i t to 
be exempt f rom most WTO disciplines, even though as a very l o w  income country with high poverty 
levels, i t can least afford to use resources inefficiently. For example, inefficient resource use results 
f rom the very high domestic market protection rates for many industries that result f rom QRs and the 
use o f  para-tariffs. Whi le in a very poor country the impulse to support protection and employment in 
local industries i s  understandable, doing so detracts f rom economic growth, diverts resources from 
more economically efficient and often more employment intensive export industries, and in the case 
o f  many o f  the protected goods, i s  equivalent t o  a regressive tax o n  consumers which runs counter to 
other policies aimed at reducing poverty. These considerations should have a larger role than they do 
at present in determining the commitments that Bangladesh i s  willing to  make at the WTO. 
Over the past few years, India’s subsidized exports o f  rice and wheat appear to be openly breaching 
the A o A  rules on agricultural export subsidies, and may jeopardize the agreement itself. As India i s  a 
l o w  cost producer by wor ld  standards o f  many major agricultural commodities, i t  has a long t e r m  
0 
0 
’ 
0 
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interest in the success o f  agreements such as the AoA, which i s  a historic attempt to begin opening up 
wor ld  agricultural markets. 
There seem to be very l i t t le awareness o f  the existence, let  alone the content o f  the W T O  TPR reports 
in the South Asian countries, even in universities and research institutes involved in policy related 
research. Seminars to discuss the content and implications o f  these reports would contribute to better 
informed debates and decisions on national trade policies. 
0 
Trade Policy Issues in Some Key Sectors 
In addition to identifying significant trade policy issues in South Asia and assessing the trade 
regimes o f  the f ive largest countries individually, this study examines the nature and recent (since 1997) 
evolution o f  the trade and trade-related policies that affect agriculture, fertilizers and the textiles and 
clothing (T&C) industries. Agriculture (including livestock, fisheries and related rural activities) s t i l l  
accounts for by the far the largest part o f  the workforces o f  the South Asian countries and major shares o f  
GDP. Fertilizers are the principal internationally tradable inputs for agriculture, and in India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, the fertilizer industry i s  one o f  the largest in the manufacturing sector. In al l  five 
countries, textiles and clothing are far ahead o f  a l l  other industries in terms o f  their share o f  
manufacturing employment and o f  total exports. Therefore the nature o f  the trade and other policies 
which affect the performance o f  these industries i s  especially important for  the acceleration o f  economic 
growth which can directly and rapidly benefit poor, skilled and unskilled rural  and urban workers. 
Subject to pressures for adaptation that arise out o f  global trade negotiations such as the Uruguay Round, 
the Agreement o n  Agriculture (AoA) and the phasing out o f  the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), 
agriculture and textiles are sectors where global market trends and opportunities may drive domestic 
policy even more rapidly in the future than in previous decades. 
Agriculture 
The report uses the term agriculture broadly to refer to livestock and fisheries as well as farming, 
and also to food processing industries. Mos t  but not a l l  o f  the international tradable products produced in 
these industries are subject to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Bhutan i s  so far not  a W T O  
member, but Nepal acceded in December 2003, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
participated in the Uruguay Round and as part o f  their WTO membership signed on to the AoA.  But for a 
number o f  reasons, signing the A o A  has so far had litt le impact on their agricultural trade policies in the 
region, because: 
Except for some Indian tar i f f  lines, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh bound nearly a l l  their agricultural 
tariffs at very high to prohibitive levels (100, 150, and 300 percent). As intended, this has given these 
countries practically unlimited discretion to increase applied tariffs up to  levels which in many cases 
amount to defacto import  bans. Only Sr i  Lanka (all A o A  tariffs bound at 50%), and Nepal (average 
A o A  binding o n  accession 42.3%) face significant WTO constraints o n  their ability to increase 
agricultural tariffs 
Agricultural support price policies and subsidies have not  so far been constrained by the AoA’s 
Aggregate Measure o f  Support (AMs) rules, in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh mainly owing to l o w  
support prices (relative to  import prices) for the major food grains, the effects o f  which outweigh 
positive support levels for some other crops and the principal agricultural input subsidies (for 
fertilizers, credit, electricity and canal irrigation). 
State trading import  and export monopolies (STEs) are allowed by the GATT, and India has 
continued to control imports o f  the principal food grains and some other agricultural commodities in 
this way. However, it has removed i t s  corresponding STE monopolies over exports, and in the other 
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South Asian countries (most recently in Pakistan) al l  STE export and import monopolies o f  
agricultural commodities have been abolished. 
They have signed o n  to “tariffs only” protection o f  their agricultural sectors, except for recognized 
GATT-legal import controls, o f  which the most important are controls justif ied under the balance o f  
payments clause, health and safety and technical standards (regulated by the SPS and TBT 
agreements) and controls based on religious and similar social considerations. However, i t i s  probable 
that a major motivation for the ways in which some o f  these controls are being implemented i s  
protection o f  particular primary and food processing industries, in addition to which some traditional 
import bans and restrictions are being s t i l l  being employed, mainly in Bangladesh, but a few also in 
Sri Lanka and Nepal. 
Another consequence o f  the A o A  was that the South Asian countries agreed not to pay any export 
subsidies, apart f rom transport and marketing subsidies until January 1, 2004, and apart f rom the use 
o f  normal export mechanisms such as duty drawback etc. Agricultural exports in South Asia have 
traditionally been restricted or taxed rather than subsidized, and in fact some export controls and taxes 
o n  primary commodities s t i l l  continue, notably in Bangladesh and Nepal. Hence the A o A  
commitment to  not  subsidize exports did not init ially represent much o f  a change from previous 
policies. However i t i s  now becoming much more o f  an issue, owing to the expiry o f  the exemption 
for transport and marketing subsidies, the increasing use o f  a variety o f  indirect export subsidies 
including transport and marketing subsidies, and because o f  India’s disposal since 2001 o f  large 
surplus stocks o f  wheat and rice at heavily subsidized export prices. 
0 
0 
Starting in about 1997 or 1998, wor ld  prices o f  some major agricultural commodities, such as 
food grains, edible oils and oilseeds, cotton, and rubber declined substantially. This has been an 
important influence behind strong pressures for increased agricultural tariffs and other forms o f  protection 
against imports, which have emerged in South Asia since then. These pressures were accentuated in India 
as a result o f  the phaseout o f  i t s  import licensing system between 1997 and 2001: this had covered al l  
agricultural commodities and processed foods and either restricted or banned imports altogether. India, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have been very responsive to these pressures, but for the most part they have 
been resisted in Palustan, which i s  continuing with a radical (by South Asian standards) liberalization o f  
i t s  trade and trade-related policies in agriculture. There has been litt le change in Nepal and Bhutan, which 
with some exceptions have continued their previous relatively open trade policies for  their agriculture 
livestock and food processing sectors. 
Some noteworthy features o f  present South Asian agricultural import  policies include the 
In terms o f  the use and level o f  formal instruments, India’s policies appear to be by far the most 
protective, followed by the policies o f  Bangladesh and Sr i  Lanka. By contrast, in Pakistan, Nepal and 
Bhutan, with some exceptions (notably edible oils in Pakistan and some food processing industries in 
Nepal), the sectors appear to be quite open to import competition. 
Non-tar i f f  measures are being freely used in India. These are formally WTO-legal (e.g. STEs, TRQs 
with out-of-quota tariffs below tar i f f  bindings, and the use o f  health, safety and technical regulations), 
but protection o f  local industries i s  often a major and frequently the predominant motive for using 
them 
There are many high to  prohibit ively high “tariff peaks” in India and Bangladesh, and some o n  major 
commodities in Sri  Lanka, which greatly exceed the general maximum tariff. India’s unweighted 
average agricultural tar i f f  i s  n o w  (for 2004/05) 40 percent, the fifth highest in the wor ld  among 106 
developing countries. The equivalent unweighted average protective tariffs in agriculture (including 
other protective import  taxes as wel l  as Customs duties) in Bangladesh (39.8%) and Sri Lanka 
(28.1%) rank seventh and thirteenth among the same sample o f  106 developing countries. 
following: 
0 
0 
0 
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There are some striking differences between the South Asian countries in the restrictiveness o f  import 
policies (i.e. the level o f  tariffs and the existence o f  non-tariff measures) which apply to some major 
commodities, such as rice, wheat, dairy products, pulses, and edible oils. For  example, the Indian 
tariffs on crude palm and refined palm o i l  in 2003/04 were respectively 65% and 85% (applied to 
fixed tar i f f  values rather then to actual c i f  prices), compared to 6% and 18% o n  actual invoiced prices 
in Nepal. Very large differences such as these create smuggling opportunities in the region, and in the 
case o f  edible oils have led India (in the context o f  the India-Nepal bilateral trade treaty) to impose 
quotas o n  imports f rom Nepal. 
Large and highly distorting agricultural input subsidies continue to exist in India (for fertilizers, 
electricity, canal irrigation and credit) and in Sri Lanka (principally for  urea and canal irrigation), but 
have mostly been abolished or substantially reduced in Palustan, Bangladesh and Nepal. 
In India, Palustan and Bangladesh, most o f  the time actual differences between domestic prices and 
wor ld  prices o f  many agricultural products are much less than tariffs that would be applied to imports 
(e.g. wheat and common rice, where tariffs in 2004/05 are respectively 50 percent and 70 percent, 
even though domestic prices in recent years have generally been lower than import prices). 
Consequently, e xcept f o r  s ome products, even a fter allowing f o r  input s ubsidies, high a gricultural 
tariffs do not reflect generally high production costs: they rather seem to be precautionary measures to 
ensure that domestic markets are fully insulated f rom any form o f  import competition. These motives 
are also important in Sri  Lanka, but in this case high tariffs are also protecting high domestic prices 
and high production costs o f  marginal farmers producing major import  substitution crops, in 
particular rice, potatoes, onions and chilies. With this important general exception, and the exception 
o f  some heavily protected products such as edible oils in India, Palustan and Bangladesh, most o f  
South Asian agriculture so far remains economically efficient with l o w  to  moderate costs by world 
standards. 
In recent years the South Asian countries have been paying increasing attention to the health and 
quality standards o f  agricultural and processed exports in order to meet the SPS standards o f  importing 
countries. Generally speaking, however, they are n o  longer explicitly taxing or using licensing or export 
bans or quotas as they did in the past to deliberately restrict their agricultural exports and depress 
domestic prices. The removal o f  cotton export QRs in India and Pakistan i s  especially significant, as for 
many years in both countries these had been used to push domestic cotton prices below wor ld  prices, 
thereby taxing farmers and subsidizing the domestic textile industry. Compulsory parastatal export 
monopolies have also been abolished, including in India where they had previously been used to prevent 
or restrict exports o f  some major commodities, notably common rice. However, there are some 
exceptions, in particular in I n d i a  where export conditions for a number o f  key commodities including 
common rice, wheat, coarse grains, wheat and coarse grain flows, sugar, bulk powdered milk, and butter 
are formally “free”, but where export contracts have to be registered with APEDA and it i s  provided that 
quantitative ceilings can be announced by the Ministry o f  Commerce (DGFT) “from time to time”. Other 
exceptions are fairly extensive l i s t s  o f  agricultural products in Bangladesh and Nepal the export o f  which 
i s  either banned or subject to export taxes. 
The South Asian countries which are WTO members a l l  have zero export subsidy commitments 
under the WTO Agreement o n  Agriculture (AoA). However, they are applying their general GATT-legal 
export policies that are used to promote manufactured exports to agricultural exports. These include the 
schemes for rebating or exempting import  duties o n  imported inputs that are used in exported products, 
such as drawback, duty exemption, bonded warehouses, the Indian duty exemption passbook schemes, 
and export processing zones. India has established a number o f  specialized agro-industrial zones for 
exporters. In addition to these, various specialized facilities and subsidies that are generally available to 
exporters are also b eing u sed for a gricultural e xports e .g. preferential p re-shipment a n d  p ost-shipment 
credit lines, export credit guarantee schemes, income and corporate tax exemptions and reductions, and 
reduced income withholding taxes. India and Palustan are also paying freight and marketing subsidies 
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(permitted in the case o f  developing countries by the A o A  until January 1,2004) for  a number o f  primary 
exports. However, since 2001 India has been selling large government surplus stocks o f  wheat and rice in 
export markets for  very l o w  prices. These sales are inconsistent with the spirit o f  the AoA, a fundamental 
purpose o f  which i s  to limit and eventually prevent domestic price support and subsidy policies which 
create exportable surpluses that are then disposed o f  by exporting at subsidized prices. Because India i s  
one o f  the world’s largest grain producers and because o f  the large scale o f  i t s  export sales relative to 
wor ld  markets (especially in the case o f  rice) this raises basic questions about the credibility o f  the A o A  
agreements and India’s own long t e r m  interest in open wor ld  agricultural markets. 
Recommendations on trade policies and agriculture 
By wor ld  standards, agriculture as a whole in India, Palustan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, i s  
internationally very competitive, even though there are a few relatively minor (in terms o f  GDP shares) 
high cost subsectors which depend o n  high protection against import competition. Sri Lankan agriculture 
i s  very different, with agricultural GDP dominated by high cost and heavily protected and subsidized rice 
and other import  substitution crops, combined with economically efficient plantation export oriented 
crops which o n  balance are discriminated against by the incentive system. This makes the liberalization 
of Sri Lanka’s trade and other agricultural policies more diff icult than would be the case in India and the 
rest o f  South Asia, owing to the greater relative impact o n  high cost import  substitution farmers. 
Despite this, a disturbing trend in India over the past few years i s  that very high protective tariffs 
are being routinely given to efficient agricultural industries with l o w  costs and prices by world standards, 
usually with arguments that wor ld  prices are l o w  and unstable and that “comfort” tariffs are needed to 
ensure that imports do not  disrupt production and affect the l ivelihood o f  large numbers o f  small 
producers. SPS, TBT and other formal ly WTO-compatible techniques are also being used to protect 
domestic industries. A similar trend has developed in Bangladesh. Experience world-wide, especially in 
agriculture, i s that h igh p rotection w ill s ooner or 1 ater c reate h igh c ost production, as 1 and, labor and  
capital move to produce products protected by high tariffs or non-tariff barriers to imports, at the expense 
of other products where pro-protection lobbies are less effective. In the protected industries, there are 
usually efficient producers who earn substantial economic rents after protection goes up, and marginal 
producers who barely break even, but both groups have a vested interest in the maintenance o f  the system. 
Exporters a n d  e xports are typically ma jo r  losers in this process, s ince they have t o  c ompete in  w orld 
markets without protection. These trends involve potentially high economic costs for producers, 
consumers and for economic growth in both countries. 
More  generally, as a l o w  cost agricultural producers, the South Asian countries have a strong 
interest that the follow-up to the Uruguay Round succeeds in reducing agricultural protectionism in the 
developed countries and freeing wor ld  agricultural markets. In particular, India has one o f  the world’s 
largest agricultural economies and can directly influence the wor ld  markets o f  many agricultural 
products. I f  it follows open, predictable, non-interventionist trade policies it can broaden these markets 
and reduce their instability, but i f it intervenes excessively to protect i t s  domestic market against 
instability in wor ld  markets, i t i s  large enough to  further increase international instability, which in turn 
reinforces protection and intervention in other countries. With the notable exception o f  i t s  recent 
subsidized exports o f r ice and wheat, and also s ome products subject t o  e xport restrictions a n d  taxes, 
India’s agricultural export policies have been relatively non-interventionist and have contributed to more 
stable international prices, since i t s  exports tend to rise when wor ld  prices go up and fal l  when wor ld  
prices decline. But the opposite i s  true o n  the import side, where there appears to  be a broad consensus in 
India that agricultural i mport  duties s hould b e f lexible within the w i d e  b ounds p ermitted by i t s  W TO 
bindings, so that they can be increased when wor ld  prices go down, and decreased when wor ld  prices rise. 
This behavior increases the amplitude o f  short run wor ld  price fluctuations and runs  counter to India’s 
own long run interests by retarding progress towards more open and stable wor ld  markets. 
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Fo r  these reasons, the economic interests o f  India and the other South Asian countries would be 
served by less interventionist and more transparent and stable agricultural trade policies. This would 
mean: 
In India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, substantially reducing both the present very high peak 
agricultural tariffs and also the general level o f  agricultural tariffs 
Resisting pressures for new high and highly variable agricultural tariffs 
Taking the initiative to remove existing non-tariff methods o f  protecting domestic agricultural 
industries and resisting pressures to introduce new protective NTBs, including especially through the 
use o f  SPS and technical regulations 
Reducing their generally prohibitively high agricultural tar i f f  bindings under the A o A  to much lower 
levels, as a way o f  providing an external constraint on domestic lobbies pressing for high protection 
Removing the present export bans, restrictions and taxes applied to agricultural products, especially in 
Bangladesh and Nepal. 
Managing domestic support price policies so that they are compatible with relatively l o w  tariffs and 
open import and export policies, and so that they do not  result in the accumulation o f  large excess 
stocks, as has occurred in recent years in India with wheat and rice 
Eschewing the use o f  agricultural export subsidies, both direct and indirect. In this regard, i t would be 
especially important for  India to ensure that i t s  present large subsidies for  exported rice and wheat do 
not  become a permanent feature o f  i t s  agricultural trade policies. 
In India and Sri Lanka, removing or phasing out the very large and highly distortionary agricultural 
input subsidies. 
Although strong arguments can be made that this l i s t  o f  reforms would serve the overall 
economic interests o f  the South Asian countries, as in the rest o f  the world, agricultural trade policies are 
highly sensitive politically, and it i s  by n o  means apparent that economic logic can or will prevail over 
polit ical compulsions. In this regard, efforts in South Asia to  reduce protection and other interventions are 
made much more difficult b y c ontinuing high a gricultural protection a n d  subsidies in  other c ountries, 
especially in the EU and the US. For example, the 2002 U S  Farm Bill helped to undermine protagonists 
o f  more open agricultural trade policies in India. Unless there i s  a major change in the direction o f  
developed country agricultural policies, it may be polit ically impossible or at least very diff icult to slow 
down, let  alone reverse the protectionist trends that have become apparent in India and to a lesser extent 
in Bangladesh in recent years, to institute meaningful reforms in Sri Lanka, or even to avoid backtraclung 
f rom the recent reforms in Pakistan. 
Fertilizers 
Judged according to their objectives i.e. l o w  fertilizer prices for farmers and the substitution o f  
local production for imports, the South Asian countries' fertilizer policies have been very successful. For 
example, farm urea prices in India declined by about 50 percent in real terms between the early 1980s and 
the mid 1990s. They have been wel l  below both average production costs and import  parity prices while 
domestic fertilizer production expanded to supply almost 90% o f  demand compared with about ha l f  in the 
early 1980s. Fertilizer prices for farmers were also kept very l o w  in Palustan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal, and in the f i r s t  three domestic production rapidly substituted for imports. 
Still, there are strong reasons for thinlung that the "green revolution" in grain farming in South 
Asia could have occurred at much lower economic cost without the subsidized farm fertilizer prices, and 
that the forced import substitution in fertilizer production also involved high economic costs which were 
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unnecessary because reliable supplies were available f rom imports. Recognizing this, al l  five countries 
have been tahng  reform initiatives o f  varying comprehensiveness. 
These reforms can be grouped into effects in the rural economy, effects o n  domestic producers, 
and effects on the government's budget. For the rural economy, subsidized l o w  prices for fertilizers lead 
to their overuse since the cost to farmers i s  lower than the opportunity costs o f  the fertilizers, where the 
opportunity cost i s  either the (marginal) cost o f  importing or producing them, plus distribution and 
marketing costs. Subsidies for non-urea fertilizers have now been abolished in al l  the South Asian 
countries except India. Urea subsidies were removed in Pahstan in 1996 and in Nepal in 1999, but there 
are s t i l l  large direct subsidies o f urea f a r m  prices in India and Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh, there i s no 
explicit subsidization o f  urea farm prices, but there are probably impl ic i t  subsidies in the sense that l o w  
prices for natural gas enable domestic producers to charge urea prices which are frequently below import 
parity prices. 
As regards domestic fertilizer production, the pursuit o f  import substitution means that traditional 
fertilizer policies in South Asia have also involved high economic costs. The sources o f  these economic 
costs include: 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e Cost-plus pricing 
e 
Direct government controls over imports 
Large input subsidies f rom l o w  preferential feedstock prices 
Absence of price competition due to government mandated prices 
Management problems o f  public sector enterprises 
Intrusive government regulation o f  f i r m s  
Finally, the traditional fertilizer policies in South Asia have involved high costs to national 
budgets. In India, where the full traditional structure i s  s t i l l  in place, the fertilizer subsidy recognized in 
the 2000/01 central government budget was 4.2% o f  total central government revenue and 0.66% o f  GDP. 
This i s  without accounting for the substantial non-quantified subsidy f rom l o w  feedstock prices to the 
domestic fertilizer industry. 
Fol lowing liberalizing reforms in the other four principal South Asian countries, only Sri Lanka 
n o w  pays an explicit budgetary subsidy (for urea), in 2000/01 equivalent to 0.21% o f  GDP. However, 
l o w  natural gas prices to  urea producers in Pakistan and Bangladesh amount to large subsidies. In 
Pakistan, these subsidies are entirely absorbed by the fertilizer manufacturers, as farm prices o f  urea are 
directly l inked to wor ld  prices through decontrol o f  imports. In Bangladesh, an unknown share i s  passed 
o n  to farmers in the fo rm o f  urea prices which are lower than import parity prices. Nepal has had no 
budgetary fertilizer subsidies since the fertilizer market was liberalized and farm fertilizer subsidies 
finally abolished in 1999. 
Recommendations on fertilizer trade policies 
The very substantial economic costs o f  the remaining subsidies and other interventions in 
fertilizer production and distribution are wel l  recognized and broadly accepted in South Asia. The reform 
agenda with the largest economic payof f  i s  in India, but backtrackmg f rom a major reform during the 
1990s, and numerous false starts, also indicate that fertilizer pol icy reform there i s  extremely diff icult 
politically, as it i s  in the other c ountries also. B ut what needs to b e done i s very c lear. The e ssential 
reforms are: 
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Abolishing or phasing out the explicit budgetary farm subsidies and the associated price and 
distribution controls in India and Sri Lanka 
Opening up fertilizer imports over l o w  to moderate tariffs in India and Bangladesh so that 
domestic prices track wor ld prices after allowing for transport and distribution costs 
Removing India’s export ban and any remaining export controls in the other countries 
Removing feedstock and other producer subsidies in India, Palustan and Bangladesh 
Abolishing or phasing out India’s cost-plus pricing (“retention price”) scheme in fertilizer 
manufacturing 
Managing whatever restructuring o f  fertilizer manufacturing and distribution follows from these 
reforms 
Textiles, garments and the MFA phaseout 
The quota system under the Multi-f iber Arrangement i s  being phased out by 2005 as part o f  the 
Agreement in Textiles and Clothing (ATC), and i ts  dismantling i s  expected to increase the market access 
opportunities for T&C products f rom South Asia countries as wel l  as pose serious challenges from 
increased competition in a quota-free regime. Exporters in South Asia wil l also have to continue to cope 
with tar i f f  preferences for competitor countries associated with regional trade agreements such as 
NAFTA, or the various preferential trade arrangements o f  the EU. 
However, South Asian countries are not evenly poised to reap the benefits f rom the larger T&C 
market or t o  cope with the new challenges. Clear beneficiaries o f  the quota system, which grew along 
with Sri  Lanka into major exporting countries o f  ready made garments (RMG) in the 1990s, Bangladesh 
and Nepal suffer f i o m m a j o r  weaknesses that might stifle future growth o f  RMG exports. These are: 
considerable dependence on buyers’ agents with buying houses providing orders for  manufacturers’ 
garmenting capacities, unreliable delivery dates and inconsistent quality, l o w  labor productivity and 
machine utilization levels, l imited market knowledge, and problems with ports and inland transport, 
especially in the case o f  Nepal. Post-MFA challenges in gaining greater market access in the expanding 
market for T&C products could be greater for these countries than for India, Palustan and Sri Lanka, 
where T&C exports have been constrained by the MFA quota system. 
Although the ATC provides the legal framework for the ten-year, four stage phasing o f  the MFA 
and the integration o f  T&C into the GATT/WTO framework by 2005, very few T&C categories 
(particularly in the largely labor-intensive apparel category) o f  interest to countries in South Asia were 
integrated in the n o w  completed three stages. The l imi ted integration o f  product categories in which the 
region’s countries have comparative advantage suggests that virtually al l  o f  the liberalization o f  the 
polit ically sensitive high value- added textile and clothing items will come in the final stage. 
Worldwide trends in T&C reveal that clothing and textile made-ups represent the growing 
segment o f  wor ld  T&C trade. Whi le  countries in South Asia have made impressive progress in exporting 
T&C products o f  good but not necessarily consistent quality, i t  has been largely in the low-  to medium- 
range o f  goods, where price i s  the main determinant o f  success. The wor ld  competition for these goods i s  
l ikely to be especially intense f rom the other low-wage countries which are increasingly being integrated 
in the global economy. I t  w o u l d  be in their interests to diversify the product composition in terms o f  
higher value-added textile and apparel products, where their labor cost advantage would be a significant 
advantage in the post-quota phase, provided they make the necessary adjustments in terms o f  reducing 
lead times through competitive sourcing o f  fabrics and enhancing transport and logistics efficiency. 
Perhaps more than in any other part o f  the world, there are very substantial economic 
opportunities in the MFA phaseout for the South Asian countries. But, except in Sri  Lanka, substantial 
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segments o f  the domestic T&C markets o f  the South Asian countries are s t i l l  heavily protected. This i s  a 
special problem in the textile sectors o f  India and Bangladesh, where many key products-especially 
synthetic fibers and yams and textile fabrics-are protected against l o w  cost imports through the use o f  
specific duties and anti-dumping in India, and by very high ad-valorem tariffs plus quantitative import 
restrictions in Bangladesh. The high protection levels o f  domestic fabrics in India has in turn led to h igh 
protection o f  domestic garment production through the use o f  specific duties against l o w  priced garment 
imports. Although Pakistan does not have QRs and i t s  textile tariffs are much lower than textile tariffs in 
India and Bangladesh, they are quite escalated and provide fairly high effective protection rates to yams 
and fabrics. For  a number o f  reasons, this suggests that these countries are far f rom ready to take full 
advantage o f  the opportunities provided by the MFA phaseout. 
Firstly, high protection takes the pressure o f f  industries to improve their performance. Low cost, 
internationally competitive domestic T&C markets will provide a much better basis for exporting to a 
more c ompetitive p ost-MFA w o r l d  than a s ituation when a 11 o r  s ome domestic s egments o f t he T &C 
industries are protected. For example, there are many advantages for garment exporters when some or al l  
o f  their fabric requirements are supplied by domestic textile f i rms e.g. shorter delivery times, closer 
contact with suppliers, avoiding the inevitably more complex formalities o f  international trade, especially 
at Customs. But exporters cannot afford to buy their inputs locally unless the f i r m s  that supply them are 
fully competitive with international suppliers. 
Secondly, exports f rom a high cost protected domestic industry are much more vulnerable to anti- 
dumping in importing countries than exports f rom open competitive domestic markets where internal 
prices are in l ine with prices in export markets. 
Thirdly, in addition to anti-dumping, after the MFA phaseout, T&C exporters in high protection 
countries are also l ike ly  to be more vulnerable than exporters in l o w  protection countries to countervailing 
duty actions in importing countries that take a im at direct and indirect subsidies, especially excessive duty 
drawbacks or subsidies resulting f rom other schemes (such as the Indian advance licenses and duty 
exemption p assbook (DEPB) scheme) which rebate o r  offset tariffs on directly or indirectly imported 
intermediate inputs. 
Fourth,, bilateral and multilateral negotiations o n  wor ld  T&C trade are sure to continue after the 
MFA phaseout, including especially negotiations o n  regional preferences and the rules o f  origin 
associated w ith them, a nti-dumping a n d  s ubsidies rules, technical and h ealth s tandards, a n d  1 abor and 
environmental standards. The South Asian countries will have a much more credible role in these 
discussions and wil l be able to pursue their own negotiating interests more effectively if segments o f  their 
own domestic markets for textiles and clothing are not hermetically sealed or heavily protected against 
imports. 
Fifth, l o w  or zero protection and open domestic markets for T&C in South Asia would remove 
much if not a l l  the motivation for both conventional and “official” (also known as “technical”) smuggling 
between India and i t s  neighbours, and would go much further towards establishing a South Asian 
common market for  textiles and clothing than has happened under SAPTA or i s  l ikely to happen under 
the various bilateral trade agreements. This could be a major initiative to pursue under the new SAFTA 
agreement. 
Sixth, open domestic markets w o u l d  a lso greatly improve t h e  b enefit to S outh A sian g arment 
exporters o f  preferential arrangements such as the EU’s GSP, which provides preferences which are a 
function o f  the cumulative total value added f rom inputs produced in SAARC countries. 
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Finally, quite apart f i om the advantages for T&C exports following the MFA phaseout, South 
Asian consumers will benefit if protection i s  reduced or eliminated, as they have in Sri Lanka where there 
i s  free trade in textiles and a l o w  12 percent tar i f f  on garments. In this regard, it i s  important to recall that 
in South Asia, although T&C exports are important, domestic sales are very large. The consumer benefits 
o f  reduced protection, lower prices, and a bigger range o f  choices between qualities and varieties in 
domestic markets are l ikely to be considerable, and in the large countries even bigger than the benefits to 
producers o f  greater success in export markets. 
Recommendations on trade policies for textiles and clothing 
For the reasons outlined above, the principal recommendation o f  this report for  the trade policies 
for the T&C sectors o f  the South Asian countries, i s  to move to (or maintain i f  they are already in place, 
as i s  the case in Sri Lanka) l o w  or zero tariff import regimes which are free o f  non-tariff barriers. This 
would require major reforms o f  current policies in India and Bangladesh, with India abolishing i t s  
specific tariffs, substantially reducing the general level o f  i t s  ad valorem T&C tariffs, and avoiding the 
use o f  anti-dumping, and with Bangladesh abolishing or phasing out i t s  textile QRs, and discontinuing 
the use o f  supplementary duties and VAT exemptions for domestic textile producers. Palustan would 
substantially reduce i t s  present prevailing 25% tar i f f  on fabrics, and al l  four countries would need to cut 
their garment tariffs. All these changes would preferably form part o f  general “tops-down” tar i f f  reform 
programs which would also simplify tar i f f  structures and make them much more uniform. 
In addition to the liberalization o f  trade policies, there are many other reforms o f  domestic 
policies and institutions which could improve the performance o f  the South Asian T&C industries and 
their capacity to face up to, and take advantage o f  the opportunities offered by the phasing out o f  the 
MFA e.g. by removing unnecessary regulatory controls, facilitating access to new technologies, 
simplifying domestic taxes and improving their administration, supporting specialized training for T&C 
workers, improving infrastructure services such as power, telecommunications, and transport, and in these 
and other ways generally creating better environments for both domestic and foreign f i r m s  to invest and 
operate in these sectors. Throughout the region, the MFA phaseout has spurred considerable activity in 
many o f  these areas which are complementary to trade pol icy reform. 
Summing up 
The trade pol icy issues examined above relate to important choices facing a l l  o f  South Asia’s five 
largest countries. The circumstances o f  each country, however, vary. Table 1 i s  meant to provide a 
compact comparative guide to the different national regimes, details o f  which will be found in the report’s 
Volume I: An Overview o f  Trade Policies in South Asia. 
The overview study o f  which this i s  a summary, i s  intended to provide current information on, 
and interpretations o f  traditional trade policies in South Asia. The premise o f  the study i s  that further 
trade liberalization would contribute to faster economic growth, and that faster economic growth i s  the 
principal long run instrument o f  poverty alleviation, provided that i t i s  accompanied by adequate attention 
to basic social welfare institutions. Against this background, the study also makes a series o f  
recommendations for reforms o f  current trade policies which are emphasized in this summary. In sum, 
this report argues that the region n o w  needs to deepen and accelerate i t s  reform in the trade pol icy area, to 
finish the process that was begun in the early 1990s by most, if not  all, South Asian countries. These 
countries need to make the fundamental shift f rom protected, import-substituting to  competitive export- 
oriented activities. 
Whi le generally not  discussed in the report, i t  i s  recognized that trade pol icy liberalization on i t s  
own  may not be sufficient, and that i t needs to be accompanied by many complementary domestic 
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reforms such as de-regulation and improvements in the functioning o f  labor markets, in governance, 
infrastructure facilities and services, and the general investment climate. Recognizing this and the 
frequent polit ical d i f f icul ty o f  initiating and sustaining trade pol icy reforms, i t i s  nevertheless hoped that 
the report will provide some starting points for applied, policy-relevant research and points o f  reference 
- ~ 
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Policies 
Exchange Rate 
Exchange Rate determination 
Payment convertibility 
Current account 
Capital account 
General import licensing 
Some QRs on imports 
State import monopolies (excl POL) 
Import restrictions (trade reasons) 
Tar i f f  structure M a y  03 
Top normal CD rate 
Other normal protective taxes 
Top normal protection rate 
Average C D  rate 
Average o f  other normal protective taxes 
Average o f  other protective taxes 
Average CD+other protective taxes 
% o f  products with total protection 
ratesznormal maximum protection rate** 
Number o f  normal C D  slabs 
Number o f  CD slabs>normal 
Range o f  C D  slabs> normal 
% o f  ad valorem tariff lines >normal CD rate 
% o f  tariff l ines with specific duties 
Uses anti-dumping 
Percent tariff lines bound at WTO 
Avg  o f  bound tariff rates 
Export policies 
Some export QRs 
Some export taxes 
Some direct export subsidies 
T"A4va,-t nvnnrt e i7hcir l ioc  
India 
March 04 
Unified 
Free float 
Yes 
Yes, limited 
N o  
Yes 
Yes 
30* 
0 
30 
22.2 
0 
0 
22.2 
2.8 
7 
17 
40-210% 
2 
5.3 
Yes 
72.4 
50.6 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
19 
Pakistan 
2002103 
Unified 
Free float 
Yes 
N o  
N o  
Yes 
N o  
25 
25 
17.3 
1.5 
0 
18.8 
1.1 
4 
10 
40-250% 
0.1 
0.9 
Yes 
36.8 
61.4 
Yes 
Yes 
N o  
Yes 
33 
2004105 
Unified 
Free float 
Yes. some l i m i t s  
No 
No, but some 
restrictions 
Yes 
N o  
25.0 
4.0 
29.0 
16.3 
3.9 
6.3 
26.5 
15.8 
4 
None: uses para- 
tariffs & VAT 
exemption for extra 
protection 
N o  
13.2 
188.3 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
33 
j at least 5% of total tal 
Sri Lanka 
Feb 04 
Unified 
Free float 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes, m n o r  
No 
27.5 
3.75 
3 1.25 
11.3 
2.1 
0 
13.4 
0.9 
6 
2 
75 &loo% 
0.2 
1.2 
No 
26 
50 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
77 
lines, and above h 
Nepal 
Unified 
Pegged to Indian 
Rupee 
August 03 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes, m n o r  
No 
25 
4.5 
29.5 
13.7 
4.3 
18.0 
5.8 
5 
3 
40,80, 130% 
5.2 
0.6 
N o  
* 
Yes 
Yes 
N o  
Yes 
44 
:h there are no more 
than 10% o f  totaitariff lines. The "general maximum " i s  30% in India because of the large number o f  agricultural Customs duties clustered at this rate. The 
Indian general maximum CD rate for industrial tariffs i s  20%.(**)Percent o f  tariff l ines with total protection rates (inclusive o f  selective para-tariffs) in excess 
of "normal maximum" CD plus normal (generally used) para-tariffs . For more details on the data in this Table see the main report, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 o f  
Chapter 3. (***) Tariff data on Bangladesh as of June, 2004. These figures reflect tariff changes announced in the FY05 budget on June 10, 2004, which 
indicated significant move towards reduction o f  p rotection: via reduction o f t  he top rate t o  2 5, move t o  three n on-zero tariffs labs, and rationalization o f  
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